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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
GIS-INTEGRATED MATHEMATICAL MODELING OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA AT 
MACRO- AND MICRO- LEVELS—A MULTIVARIATE GEOGRAPHICALLY-WEIGHTED 
REGRESSION MODEL FOR IDENTIFYING LOCATIONS VULNERABLE TO HOSTING 
TERRORIST SAFE-HOUSES: FRANCE AS CASE STUDY 
by 
 
Elyktra Claire Eisman 
 
Florida International University, 2015 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor Thomas A. Breslin, Major Professor 
 
Adaptability and invisibility are hallmarks of modern terrorism, and keeping pace with its 
dynamic nature presents a serious challenge for societies throughout the world. 
Innovations in computer science have incorporated applied mathematics to develop a 
wide array of predictive models to support the variety of approaches to counterterrorism. 
Predictive models are usually designed to forecast the location of attacks. Although this 
may protect individual structures or locations, it does not reduce the threat—it merely 
changes the target.  While predictive models dedicated to events or social relationships 
receive much attention where the mathematical and social science communities 
intersect, models dedicated to terrorist locations such as safe-houses (rather than their 
targets or training sites) are rare and possibly nonexistent. At the time of this research, 
there were no publically available models designed to predict locations where violent 
extremists are likely to reside. This research uses France as a case study to present a 
complex systems model that incorporates multiple quantitative, qualitative and 
geospatial variables that differ in terms of scale, weight, and type.   Though many of 
these variables are recognized by specialists in security studies, there remains 
controversy with respect to their relative importance, degree of interaction, and 
vi 
 
interdependence. Additionally, some of the variables proposed in this research are not 
generally recognized as drivers, yet they warrant examination based on their potential 
role within a complex system. This research tested multiple regression models and 
determined that geographically-weighted regression analysis produced the most 
accurate result to accommodate non-stationary coefficient behavior, demonstrating that 
geographic variables are critical to understanding and predicting the phenomenon of 
terrorism. This dissertation presents a flexible prototypical model that can be refined and 
applied to other regions to inform stakeholders such as policy-makers and law 
enforcement in their efforts to improve national security and enhance quality-of-life.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Adaptability and invisibility are hallmarks of modern terrorism, and keeping pace with its 
dynamic nature presents a serious challenge for societies throughout the world. The 
rising profile of terrorism has resulted in an acute awareness of both its reach and its 
destructive capabilities. Enormous resource expenditures are allocated to its eradication, 
yet the agility with which it responds to countermeasures has endowed it with a lasting 
resilience.  This frontless conflict has required of its targets a level of vigilance exceeding 
that which many of them have ever experienced.  Conventional combat techniques have 
fallen short of providing a level of security acceptable to the populations they are 
intended to protect.  To that end, both the private and public sectors have experimented 
with creative technological applications in an effort to understand this enemy with the 
intention of anticipating its behavior. 
 
Innovations in computer science have incorporated applied mathematics to develop a 
wide array of models that reflect the variety of approaches to counterterrorism.  Many of 
these are analytical, as it is hoped that added insight will bring more effective solutions, 
and this is certainly true.  Others are predictive.  While both types value substantive 
understanding, predictive models lend their focus to prevention.  
 
Predictive models are generally designed to forecast the location of attacks. Successful 
prediction is assessed by the model’s ability to reveal vulnerable locations so that 
appropriate defensive measures can be implemented. Although this may protect 
individual structures or locations, it does not reduce the threat—it merely changes the 
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target.  This reality has not been lost on the security community. Therefore, resources 
and efforts have been directed at identifying the origin of the threat.  Such models 
frequently employ agent-based modeling and social network analysis, as they focus on 
the inter-personal relationships that constitute terrorist networks.  The value of their 
contribution is evident from their continued use and from the resources currently devoted 
to further training and research.  While predictive models dedicated to events or social 
relationships receive much attention where the mathematical and social science 
communities intersect, models dedicated to terrorist locations such as safe-houses 
(rather than their targets or training sites) are rare and possibly nonexistent. At the time 
of this research, there are no publically available models designed to predict locations 
where violent extremists are likely to reside. 
 
This question requires a complex systems model to incorporate the variety of 
quantitative, qualitative and geospatial variables that might impact the model. The 
selection of a safe-house location is dependent on many variables that differ in terms of 
scale, weight, and type.   Though many of these variables are recognized by specialists 
in security studies, there remains controversy with respect to their relative importance, 
degree of interaction, and interdependence. Additionally, some of the variables proposed 
in this research are not generally recognized as drivers, yet they warrant examination 
based on their potential role within a complex system. 
 
These variables act as constraints and drivers that influence an individual’s decision-
making process in determining the most viable and safest place to live.  Geography is a 
multi-dimensional variable set that must be included to answer the question. The choice 
of where to situate oneself has objective and subjective components. The subjective 
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aspects of decision-making, such as feelings and perceptions about environmental 
suitability, often have a basis in objectivity. Enclaves comprising a single ethnic or 
national majority often exist because events encouraged group migrations from one 
geographic region to another. There was either a driver at the point of origin, a driver to 
encourage migration to the destination, or a combination of both. The drivers affecting 
these migrations affect the contemporary social atmosphere within the immigrant 
communities and the attitudes of citizens of the host country.  The location of these 
enclaves within the spatial context of the host country and the accessibility to and from 
the country of origin, can play a significant role in how other variables impact the model. 
For example, an individual might choose to live in an enclave of his home culture 
because a life among natives of the host nation would expose him to unfriendly attitudes 
and treatment. Residence within this enclave could restrict access to some resources, 
just as it could increase access to other resources open only to those in a circle of trust. 
Residence in the enclave might increase or decrease mobility, depending on where and 
in what context the individual wanted to travel. Mobility is increased if there is benefit to 
blending in with a crowd, but can be challenging if one must travel outside the enclave or 
cover a large distance. Thus, the size and shape of these enclaves and the geographic 
resources (such as infrastructure) available to them can affect the model.  This reality is 
understood by social scientists, especially geographers, historians, and political 
scientists. Doreen Massey (2005) characterizes space as being "…about relations, 
fractures, discontinuities, practices of engagement…" as an "…intrinsic relationality of 
the spatial…" (Massey, 85). Geography encompasses a set of variables that must be 
incorporated. Brunsdon et al (1998) presented geographically weighted regression to 
address the problem of multivariate non-stationarity in geographic space.   
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For the regression function 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 
 
Brunsdon et al estimate (β jp j) for each variable j and each location i with localized 
coefficients. They suggest potential localization functions, among them the Gaussian 
distance-decay-based weighting function 
 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑒𝑒−𝑑𝑑2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/2ℎ2 
 
bounding each regression estimate.  Here, dik is the distance between observations i 
and k.  The constant h is a constraint on dik—the kernel bandwidth—and is described in 
detail in the chapters “Model Development and Design” and “Exploratory Regression 
Analysis Candidate Variables” . 
 
GIS platforms can accommodate the plethora of variable types that must be 
incorporated to conduct this novel approach to identifying where violent extremists might 
call “home”. GIS platforms can process multiple factors that cannot be adequately 
modeled with linear analytic technique. Additionally, GIS software environments can 
present multidimensional models visually in a way that can more easily be understood 
than by more traditional, textual methods. Additionally, the variables and datasets can be 
updated and rectified to refine the model, resulting in greater sophistication of analysis.  
GIS software also has the ability to retain a history of model updates so a user may keep 
a record of variable changes and model adaptations.  This is essential for future 
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researchers to be able to see the evolution of this model and adapt it for their own uses 
as well as validate it in future studies. 
 
Most importantly, this dissertation research shows that geography is critical to 
understanding and predicting the phenomenon of terrorism. Clare Richardson (2011)  
conducted a multivariate regression analysis examining the power of relative deprivation 
theory to explain radicalization. Her global study examined 56 countries between 1980 
and 2008 to assess the correlation of unemployment and tertiary education levels with 
terrorist attacks. Since her research analyzes data at the country level, the analysis 
conceptualizes a country as a community. However, in examining potential drivers of 
radicalization, this approach limits the depth to which one can study the phenomenon. 
The country-as-community approach emphasizes shared identity on a macro-level, and 
assumes that there is indeed a country-level shared identity. The problem of 
radicalization might stem in part from individuals or small groups not identifying with the 
host country. In this context, a country-level analysis would overlook that phenomenon. 
 
 
Central Research Question 
 
This dissertation endeavors to determine the factors that promote an environment that 
drives and sustains radicalization.  Certain assumptions have been made with respect to 
the nature and identity of these contributing factors in order to focus the research and 
make it viable.  The first assumption is that the most influential factors are social and/or 
geographical. The second assumption is that the selected factors have the most 
significant impact in answering the following central research question— 
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"What factors influence or determine the probability that a region will host a base of 
operation—or safe-house—for terrorist activities, and if so, why do these factors play 
significant roles?” 
 
The dependent variable was narrowly constrained to facilitate testing against the set of 
independent variables. Thus, the dependent variable—the existence of an arrest/raid 
location—was limited to those raids and arrests that were associated with Islamic 
extremist ideologies. Broadening the scope to include other extremist ideologies such as 
militant Basque separatism, would require the inclusion of additional variables and 
datasets. Some of the variables and datasets might not be relevant to datapoints 
associated with Islamic extremism. For example, variables that would exacerbate or 
inhibit Basque extremism might not have any effect on Islamic extremism, as different 
social groups and value systems are in play.  
  
II. Methodology 
 
Overview 
 
The regression analysis tested multiple variables with and without geographic weighting 
to determine the existence and importance of geographic factors to the design of a 
viable model. 
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This research determined that geographically-weighted regression analysis produced 
the most accurate model among the regression models tested for this research. 
Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) generates a multivariate predictive model 
that functions in a geospatial information systems (GIS) environment.  This model was 
developed and tested in ESRI’s ArcGIS 10.2.   
 
Whereas other types of multivariate regression analysis assume that variables—or 
regression coefficients—behave uniformly throughout the model, geographically 
weighted regression (GWR) accommodates non-stationary coefficient behavior. For 
instance, independent variables might affect the dependent variable in different ways 
depending on the geographic space, with the coefficient varying locally, rather than 
having one effect that permeates the model space. For the model in this research, GWR 
analyzes the coefficient behavior around event locations and outputs coefficient values 
around these “fit points”.  
 
Sample Data 
 
In this research, the test data are event locations and residences where an arrest or raid 
occurred and where weapons, bomb-making materials, and extremist literature were 
discovered by law enforcement. Test data—hereafter referred to as events or event 
data—were obtained from newspaper reports and online databases from 2008 through 
2012. Unfortunately, these sources do not always provide sufficient geographic detail on 
every event.  For instance, an arrest or raid was described as having occurred in Paris, 
but no other information, such as arrondissement or street address, was provided. This 
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lack of granularity limits the model’s accuracy because there is no localized datapoint 
around which to test the coefficient behavior. Granularity inconsistencies also caused a 
clustering effect that artificially increased the dependent variable count in cities that 
contained multiple event occurrences. These event clusters could not be accurately 
distributed because the report did not specify where in the city the event occurred. 
Methodologically, there are different approaches to this problem. Among the simplest 
and most direct is to eliminate those events from the dataset or distribute the datapoints 
throughout the city, based on one or more criteria, such as population or even 
distribution throughout the city’s arrondissements. Since there are only 50 datapoints 
that fit the criteria to qualify as events, or test data, omission was a last resort given that 
regression techniques, especially those incorporating geospatial attributes, generally 
speaking, function best with as large a sample size as possible. (Knofczynski & 
Mundfrom, 2008) (Chang)1 Distribution of datapoints according to population density 
was also considered. This method was rejected because its inclusion implies that an 
independent variable—population density—is a regression coefficient before the model 
has been generated. Therefore, the clustered events were distributed throughout the city 
as evenly as possible with respect to arrondissements around the city centroid, not 
adjusting to any other variable that might artificially incorporate it as a coefficient value. 
 
 
 
                                                
1Knofczynski and Mundrom (2008) conducted Monte Carlo simulations to determine minimum sample sizes 
for different numbers of independent variables and correlation levels. Their analysis indicates a sample size 
of 21 can produce “good” estimation for an R2value of .7. The GWR in this research yields an R2 of .71. 
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Methodology—GIS Platform 
 
The analysis uses geographically-weighted regression to examine multiple factors that 
might correlate with locations where raids and arrests have revealed extremist literature, 
weapons, or bomb-making materials, or where individuals suspected of planning or 
participating in terrorism-related activities have resided. ESRI software was selected 
based on its extensive library of geostatistical tools and its ability to incorporate large 
datasets, process them and display the results cartographically. The software is also 
widely available, so the resulting prototype model can be tested and refined by those 
interested in adapting the model to a different case. 
 
Data for Coefficient Computation—Challenges of incorporating data from multiple 
sources and in multiple formats 
 
Despite ArcGIS flexibility, model implementation was not a matter of plug-and-play. 
Datasets were imported in tabular form, but often shape files (a native file format of 
ArcGIS)  had to be built in order to conduct geostatistical analyses and display the data 
properly. Creating shapefiles is time consuming, labor intensive, and requires a high 
level of attention to detail when generating georeferenced points for analysis.  
 
Datasets were obtained from INSEE, Eurostat, Data.Gouv.Fr, GADM.org, Pew 
Research, Diva-GIS, and ESRI. Data granularity, unique location identifiers, and file 
formats differed and often had to be manually edited before they were integrated in the 
GIS environment for processing. In addition to manual editing of individual files, one of 
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the most important factors was table and data integration which allowed data from 
different sources to be combined and analyzed as an entire data set.  The section below 
details these challenges and the techniques used to surmount them. 
 
The first obstacle was one of semantics. Definitions of communes and arrondissements 
were often mislabeled, and some sources referred to arrondissements as communes 
and vice versa. Official terminology is often problematic for performing relational joins. A 
join is a unique identifier that allows records from two or more tables to be joined 
together so the entire linked contents can be queried.  For instance, a shapefile listed 
350 arrondissements, yet there are officially only 342.  
 
The discrepancy might be due in part to the term “arrondissement” being used to refer to 
two types of administrative divisions. Departmental arrondissements refer to the 342 
subdivisions of France’s 342 departments. However, Lyon, Marseille, and Paris are 
departmental arrondissements that contain municipal arrondissements.2 Cantons are a 
finer level of granularity than departmental arrondissements but are not always strict 
subdivisions of arrondissements. Cantons contain multiple communes but the 
boundaries do not always coincide with commune boundaries, as they can straddle 
communes. INSEE does not list the number of cantons, but its datasets list 3,785 
“canton-ou-ville”—canton or city. Other sources list 3,883 cantons or 4,055 cantons34. 
                                                
2http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/Arrondissements_of_France#References 
 
3Gael L’Hermine. Local Government in France. World Elections 
Blog.https://welections.wordpress.com/links/guide-to-the-2014-french-elections/. List 4,055 
cantons. 
 
4http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/20/southern-france-sarkozy-shale-gas. Lists 
3,883 cantons. 
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INSEE defines the commune as the smallest municipal division and lists 36,682. GIS-
Diva hosted Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM) shapefiles consisting of 
350 arrondissements. Since the shapefile projected accurately, I used the 350 
arrondissements as a guide for obtaining and joining the other datasets. 
 
As a result of these variations in territorial definitions, the independent variable that 
quantified ethnic representation on the municipal level presented one of the most 
significant data processing challenges in this research. A dataset that could enable 
quantification of how well-represented those of North African and Middle Eastern 
heritage were within their communities could shed light on the impact of having a 
political voice. I could find no published datasets that quantified this type of 
representation, largely because France does not gather data on the ethnicity of its 
political candidates. Data.gouv.fr retains municipal election data, but the downloadable 
datasets contained voting statistics only—not candidate and winner names. The site 
does not offer the ability to download datasets that list the names of those elected. To 
get the data that displays the candidate names, I drilled down to the commune level 
within each department separately via a multi-step process.  
 
First, I navigated to the page corresponding to a specific department on the website. The 
department page displays a directory of several pages, each page containing groups of 
communes in that department. After choosing a page for a group of communes, I 
selected a link to a commune, to display the data with the winning candidates and the 
number of votes. There is a download link on each page, but the downloaded data does 
not contain candidate names. Since there is no way to download the displayed data, I 
manually copied and pasted directly from the webpage to an excel sheet to save the 
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data in tabular format. Once on the spreadsheet, I calculated the total number of 
municipal level representatives by summing several blocks of entries separately 
because fields are merged. Then, I scrutinized the representatives’ first and last names 
to identify those that were likely Middle Eastern or North African in origin. The 
percentage ethnic municipal level representation is the ratio of the names I assessed as 
ethnic to the total number of representatives on each municipal council. This process 
had to be followed 350 times, resulting in 350 spreadsheets divided among 5 excel files. 
 
I faced similar challenges when gathering statistics on departmental ethnicities. INSEE’s 
data was buried under multiple menu layers. Most of the INSEE datasets only 
differentiated on the basis of immigrant or non-immigrant, or French or non-French 
citizen. To discover specific nationalities of immigrants, I located datasets on the 
regional level and downloaded each individually. Each dataset had to be renamed 
because all the regions saved their datasets as the same filename. To obtain 
departmental statistics, I computed percentages from the raw numbers for each 
department within each region’s file. The percentages for each nationality in 101 
departments were compiled in a separate table with geographic coordinates of 
department centroids. Finally, the data could be imported to the GIS software for 
analysis. 
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France as Test Case 
 
The enormous datasets common to GIS applications require that this research be limited 
to a single country case study.  France has been selected as the case study primarily for 
the availability of its social and GIS data.  It also contains multiple ethnic communities 
that have historically presented a security threat, shares borders with several states, and 
has major sea ports. France has the highest Muslim population percentage in Europe 
(approximately 7.5%) and tension exists between this population and the host state. 
Thus, the safe-houses of interest are often those of extremist Islamic actors.56 
 
France has a government whose president and senate are elected via its electoral 
college, enabling its citizens to effect change through the ballot box.  Yet, it faces the 
unwelcome challenge of domestic terrorism.  The profiles of these hostile actors 
complicate analyses, as not all are first-generation immigrants from cultures with a 
history of religious fundamentalism.  Although France offers its citizens free education 
for those aged 2-16 and a universal healthcare system (Dutton, 2007), many of the 
hostile actors that threaten France’s national security are native-born citizens who were 
converted and radicalized by Muslim extremists. This reality discredits theories that 
postulate that repressive governments, lack of educational opportunities, and basic 
                                                
5Population data estimated for 2010. According to Pew Research Center, there were 
approximately 4.7 million Muslims in France. Germany has the highest Muslim population in 
Europe—approximately 4.8 million—but that population comprised approximately 5.8% of its 
population. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/01/15/5-facts-about-the-muslim-
population-in-europe/. 
 
62010 Pew Report--"Muslim Population by Country". The Future of the Global Muslim Population. 
Pew Research Center.http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/. 
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services such as healthcare are the drivers of radicalization. The dynamic is not so 
easily explained. 
 
France’s foreign policy is not hostile to states with large Muslim populations. France did 
not join U.S. forces in the invasion of Iraq—a military action that was unpopular with 
Middle Eastern states.  It supported a multilateral peace agreement concerning Israel 
and is in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state (State Department Bureau of 
European and Eurasian Affairs, 2008). 
 
Therefore, significant factors must be present to account for the severity of France’s 
security problem.   
 
“… France has never fully accepted North African immigrants, and the 
second generation perhaps even less than the first. That they speak 
French fluently and readily absorb French culture does not make them 
welcome in France as earlier waves of immigrants had been…Most North 
Africans feel they are trapped in a hopeless downward spiral of 
joblessness, racial discrimination, and clashes with police.” (Tlemçani, 
1997) 
Although France is officially a secular state, religion plays a significant cultural role. 
France is historically Catholic,7 and the introduction of a relatively recent but significant 
Muslim population alters its cultural composition. The secular government has actively 
                                                
7 Catholicism was the state religion until 1787, excluding the period between 1592-1685 during 
which the Edict of Nantes endowed Protestants with limited rights. 
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and officially supported and promoted its Muslim immigrant communities economically, 
politically, and culturally. For example, Muslims in military service have access to Muslim 
clergy and meals consistent with Islamic law. Commercial establishments provide time 
off and special facilities for Islamic prayer. (Viorst, 1996) 
 
Despite its efforts, France continues to face challenges integrating its immigrant 
populations, regardless of their ethnicity.  The most significant barrier is difficult to 
pinpoint, but it is likely a combination of factors. Ethnic, religious, and economic drivers 
are the most frequently cited obstacles for North Africans and Middle Eastern 
populations.  
 
Doug Ireland (2005), a journalist reporting on politics and culture who spent ten years in 
France, blames a “…deep-seated, searing, soul-destroying racism that the unemployed 
and profoundly alienated young of the ghettos face every day of their lives, both from the 
police, and when trying to find a job or decent housing.” 
 
Patrick Simon, et al (2010) encountered racial prejudice in his research on French 
identity. He refers to France as an assimilationist country because it requires that 
immigrants identify exclusively as French, explaining that its government and citizens 
view a hyphenated ethnic identity as incomplete assimilation and thus not genuinely 
“French”. Simon’s research analyzes data from the 2008-2009 survey, Trajectories and 
Origins: Survey on Population Diversity in France (TeO). The Institut National d’Études 
Démographiques (INED), the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
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Économiques (INSEE), and Patrick Simon conducted the research. The survey queried 
22,000 residents of mainland France—the largest survey ever conducted that comprised 
first- and second-generation immigrants as well as non-immigrant French (native-born 
for two generations). It examined French identity and social cohesion, asking 
respondents who they consider French, whether or to what degree they perceive 
themselves as French, and what impacts these perceptions.  Respondents were also 
asked how others perceived their identity, and how their perceptions of others’ views 
affected their self-identification as French. Simon detected a visual component affecting 
whether or not an individual is accepted as truly French, and that those from 
predominantly Muslim countries are most negatively affected by that prejudice. Simon 
observed that “The feeling of having one’s Frenchness denied clearly follows a ‘line of 
visibility’ affecting primarily immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and their descendants, 
then immigrants and descendants from North Africa, Turkey, and Southeast Asia. The 
pattern is completely different for immigrants from Europe, who feel accepted in the 
national community.” He adds that people are assessed on whether or not they “look 
French”. (Simon, 2012) The unspoken requirement to physically appear western 
European places inescapable restrictions on those who do not conform to that “look”, 
and the lack of control over how completely one can integrate or assimilate will inevitably 
breed frustration. The intensity of that frustration is exacerbated or mitigated by many 
factors both external and internal to the individual, but the ethnic component affecting 
acceptance as French might play a role in how susceptible one is to extreme ideologies 
associated with the identity to which that individual is tied. 
 
Adida, et al (2009) differentiated ethnic from religious components by surveying two 
groups—one Muslim and one Christian—of second- and third-generation Senegalese 
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immigrants. Both groups are ethno-linguistically equivalent. Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 
measured the groups’ assimilation into French society, defining assimilation as, “…(i) 
their attachment to their culture of origin; and (ii) their identiﬁcation with the host culture 
and society.” (Adida et al, 2012) While both groups experienced integration obstacles, 
the Muslim Senegalese immigrants in the sample were significantly less-integrated than 
the Christians in the sample. Adida et al’s findings are based on 2009 field experiments 
they conducted on these groups. The experiments consisted of behavioral games 
designed to measure trust and altruism. Their results showed that native French 
participants (individuals outside the sample sets whose grandparents are French-born) 
tend to more often discriminate against the Muslim set because they are more likely to 
have recognizably Muslim first names. The Muslims in the sample set are more likely to 
perceive systemic discrimination from French institutions and as a result, choose not to 
participate in them. 
 
Milton Viorst (1996) argues the barriers have economic roots, but his explanation implies 
an ethnic component as well, since mostly Northern African ethnic groups responded to 
the economic driver that generated the integration barrier. Many of France’s Muslim 
youth are descendants of immigrants from France’s former colonies. The older 
generation immigrated to France just after World War II to fill a labor demand to rebuild 
the city, compensating for the post-war shortage of working-age French males. Many of 
the immigrants settled permanently, but the labor demand and economic growth did not 
continue into the coming generations. High unemployment can reduce the motivation to 
pursue an education if a degree is unlikely to result in a profitable career. The resulting 
poverty breeds crime, frustration, and fodder for extremists recruiting new adherents. 
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Religious, ethnic, and economic forces and other conflict points foster an environment 
that can impede, if not prevent, the integration of Muslim immigrants into French society.  
Therefore, these individuals may be unlikely to see themselves as Frenchmen even after 
they obtain citizenship.  Their primary identity often rests with either their country of 
origin or with their religion.  Furthermore, perceptions of rejection by the host country 
(France) and its citizens, combined with a sense of deprivation of opportunities enjoyed 
by its natives, provide a breeding ground of resentment and hostility that could render 
them vulnerable to radicalization or to tolerating an environment where extremists can 
operate. 
 
However, one cannot assume that unwillingness to self-identify as French is the root 
factor contributing to the development of terrorist safehavens, and that its impact 
overrides that of an economically vibrant and open society.  Terrorists do not establish 
bases uniformly throughout the country.  Nor do they establish them randomly in Muslim 
enclaves.   
 
Closer examination indicates the presence of multiple contributing factors of varying 
weights, and these are found in other countries, as well.  These factors and their 
relationships are highly complex, and assume different degrees of importance 
depending on the country context in which they are considered.  
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III. Related Research 
 
A body of research has applied quantitative techniques to parse through an array of 
potential drivers related to some aspect of radicalized behavior, be it criminally or 
ideologically motivated.  Some of these efforts have incorporated geospatial 
components. Others have focused on cultural or economic drivers. The research 
presented in this dissertation considers social, political, geospatial, and economic 
factors.  Further, previous research has focused on attacks, pre-attack activities, and 
training sites.  This dissertation research seeks insights into identifying where terrorists 
might establish their residences. Others have conducted research incorporating 
geospatial and temporal analytic techniques. The regression model presented in this 
research does not include temporal analysis due to limitations in the sample set., 
Suggestions on how temporal analysis might be included in future efforts are included in 
the text for cases in which an appropriate sample set is available. 
 
Smith et al. (2006) incorporated multiple social and geographic factors with a temporal 
component to discover timing and distance patterns in preparatory and attack activities 
associated with terrorism.  Smith et al. used datasets provided by law enforcement 
entities and thus had highly granular data with which to develop and test their research. 
This data8 consisted of 38 data points spanning a 25-year period, each data point 
consisting of addresses of terrorists’ residences, preparation areas, and attack locations 
                                                
8 Some data points did not have sufficient temporal data, so they were not included in the 38 
sample points for the aspect of the research that incorporated temporal analysis. 
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in the United States.9  The temporal component of the analysis consisted of dividing the 
geo-located data into four chronological stages designated by type of activity, from 
recruitment and preparation to the culminating act, such as a bombing. In reviewing this 
research, the reader should keep in mind that the study data was limited to the United 
States, and thus the conclusions of Smith et al. might not apply to terrorist behavior in 
other countries.  
 
Temporal analysis revealed that the average time period between recruitment and 
culminating act is relatively short—approximately three months, and that the geospatial 
pattern is well-defined for international, left-wing, and single-issue (such as animal 
rights) terrorists. The geospatial pattern is bi-modal, in that nearly half the attacks 
occurred within 30 miles of the terrorist’s residence, but over a third of the attacks were 
at least 271 miles away.10 
 
Though the research of Smith et al was geospatially based and incorporated variables 
such as crime—it included both criminal and non-criminal preparatory behavior—social 
support systems, its focus was behavioral, and thus did not include the variety of 
environmental variables that could impact the behaviors and the pace with which those 
behaviors would unfold. However, they speculated on potential drivers behind the 
localized spatial pattern associated with international terrorists and in doing so, 
highlighted variables that could impact extremist behavior. Smith et al suggested that 
international terrorists’ residential locations were restricted by “…new immigration status, 
lack of transportation, lack of knowledge of the urban landscape, an attempt to minimize 
                                                
9 The types of terrorism included environmental, single-issue, right-wing, left-wing, and 
international terrorism. 
10Right wing terrorists did not conform to this unusual pattern. 
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attention or a variety of other reasons.” (Smith, Damphousse, & Roberts, 2006) Variables 
such as immigration status, unfamiliarity with the urban landscape, and concern about 
not blending in, allude to several of the variables tested in the regression analyses 
presented in this dissertation. 
 
Research involving the intersection of terrorism studies with GWR is rare, but innovative 
research has been conducted using GWR to provide insight on what factors impact a 
location’s vulnerability as a target. Economists Öcal and Yildirim (2013) used 
geographically weighted regression to study terrorism in Turkey. Their research, while 
informative, focuses on the behavior of a terrorism index comprised of terrorism-related 
incidents, injuries and fatalities--not terrorist safe-houses. Dependent variables are 
primarily economic but do include a schooling ratio and dummy variable for coastal 
provinces. Analyzing the results of this model design can be challenging, due to the risk 
of conflating target selection with agent development. To wit, they assess that increases 
in per capita income might increase a location's attractiveness as a target. This 
conclusion is logical and borne out in the regression results. They explain that education 
and employment might be higher in provinces with lower terror indices because 
individuals who are employed or educated would have more to lose if these areas were 
hit. This may indeed be true, but this assessment contains an implicit assumption that 
terrorists live or work in the areas they target. Moreover, the variable choice conflates 
agency, because the analysis also seeks to explain radicalization drivers as well as 
incidents, thus conflating two dependent variables. The research presented in this 
dissertation acknowledges the value of including economic and educational variables, 
but also considers political, social, and religious drivers. Further, it examines geographic 
features as candidate independent variables and weighting coefficients to add further 
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dimension to the GWR model. The inclusion of geographic features as weights or 
variables in their own right was shown to be not applicable in the test case used for this 
research, but it could enhance the model in other applications and thus is described in 
detail in the chapter "Existing Smuggling Routes", "Border Proximity", and "Micro-level 
Variables". 
 
France’s government entities and research institutions collect much of the data 
necessary to pursue this research.  Institut National de la Statistique et des Études 
Économiques—National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE)—is 
France's statistical repository.  INSEE contains an extensive library of social statistics, 
some of which are specific to the commune level. Data.Gouv.Fr, another useful data 
source, is France's open data web presence. It consolidates datasets in csv and xlsx 
formats from multiple sources, and includes election statistics and data gathered by 
many of France's ministries.  Eurostat provides statistical data to the European Union 
(EU), and hosts a library of publicly available datasets on EU member states. Pew 
Research provided data that is the basis for building political representation tables for 
testing variables, as well as political opinion polls that were sourced for the analysis. 
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IV. Model Development and Design 
 
The following section explains the development of the regression model, beginning with 
an examination of candidate algorithms to determine those most appropriate for 
incorporation in the analysis. Some of the algorithms were developed for 
counterterrorism applications, such as insurance industry-related terrorism risk models, 
terrorism attack models for national security applications, and models developed by 
researchers that identify likely terrorist training sites. Other potential algorithms appear in 
models developed by the academic community and are not directly related to terrorism.  
Examples of these include statistical modeling of teenage social structures and alcohol 
consumption, a kernel weighting function that incorporates geographic space with 
attribute space to assess tree-stand patterns, and a spectral clustering algorithm to 
identify criminal communities. 
 
Much of the current research that applies predictive modeling techniques to terrorism 
concerns risk analysis.  The insurance industry is a major patron of such research, as it 
is aware that physical structures bear varying risks depending on the context in which 
they are situated.  Insurers are also aware that that the context is constituted by an 
interplay of multiple factors at multiple levels.  The challenges involved with producing 
accurate assessments of risk levels require the utilization of complex models with 
delicately calibrated factors.  Yet, successful design and execution of these models is 
worth the cost of funding these efforts.  Insurance companies risk substantial financial 
losses if a structure is situated in a high risk area, or if the implemented security 
precautions are inappropriate to the type of risk to which the structure is subjected.   
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To that end, RAND’s Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy has applied the 
Probabilistic Terrorism Model designed by Risk Management Solutions to the 
examination of terrorism in urban settings. The model is often used by the insurance 
industry to assess liabilities associated with potential terrorist attacks. However, its 
scope is limited to the United States, and the analyses it generates are based on 
scenarios involving attack events on fixed targets. Critical factors in the analyses are 
limited to physical qualities, such as explosive type and building design.  It is unlikely 
that social mechanisms are considered, although this cannot be said for certain, as 
detailed information regarding this model’s design is publicly unavailable. The RAND 
Corporation was given access to this model for its terrorism research. However, RAND 
has used it to study discrete event risks, rather than a continuously unfolding situation to 
which such events can be traced. 
 
Another model designed to serve insurance industry counter-terrorism needs is 
TerrorRisk, and like the RAND model, it is also focused on potential attack targets. 
Simon Sole, CEO of Exclusive Analysis, developed this location-based model with 
Pitney-Bowes MapInfo, and he says it enables his clients “…to precisely differentiate 
terrorism risk, right down to building level”. (Francica, 2007) TerrorRisk uses Pitney 
Bowes MapInfo to analyze 3,700 locations of interest. The model incorporates pre-
assigned numeric coefficients, called “Risk Values”, with an insurance company’s 
portfolio to assess its locations’ risks of terrorism-related damage.  However, information 
on how it develops the coefficients and what algorithm drives the model is not publically 
available. 
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Products such as Risk Management Solutions’ Probabilistic Terrorism Model and 
Exclusive Analysis’ TerrorRisk are of a proprietary nature, so their financial value, 
coupled with the security risk that would result from public release, precludes the 
possibility of examining these projects in depth. However, some methodologies and their 
datasets are publically available. 
 
The Open Source Center (OSC) has modeled terrorist attack incidents in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan using 2004-2008 datasets provided by the National Counter-terrorism 
Center (NCTC).  The geospatial modeling project reveals hot spots that may provide 
insight into security vulnerabilities and how stakeholders might address regional 
instability. (Open Source Center, 2009) 
 
The OSC project's predictive modeling component uses geographic features common to 
most terrorist incidents in the dataset to assess probable locations of future attacks.  Its 
model resulted in a success rate of nearly 69% for locations deemed of high probability.  
While the OSC’s model includes social factors such as roads, population density and 
ethnicity, this dissertation will consider other factors as well.  The incorporation of these 
additional variables should result in a more accurate and granular model if integrated 
with sufficient analytical rigor.  The proposed model is necessarily more demanding than 
the Open Source Center's model, as it endeavors to do other than predict an incident.  
Whereas the primary consideration in attack-planning is the target, with success 
depending on brief time spans (e.g., the need to access a location just long enough to 
execute the attack), safe-houses require more lengthy access, reliable ingress and 
egress, and ideally, opportunities to replenish the human resource pool.  Plotting 
potential safe-house locations calls for greater intricacy of modeling and weighting but 
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the additional effort can result in significant social benefit, as the identification of at-risk 
neighborhoods can highlight the need to address issues that will improve the quality of 
life in those areas and, by extension, the larger region in which they are located. (Open 
Source Center, 2009) 
 
OSC’s work is incident-focused, but counter-terrorism research has also produced 
location-focused predictive models. This type of research has been conducted by 
Douglas Way. His work concerns the identification of terrorist locations. (Way, 2003)  
However, unlike the proposed dissertation research, his work has been focused on 
locating training camps in remote regions. Training camps differ from safe-houses both 
in purpose and in context.  Therefore, the factors contributing to their establishment 
differ as well. Additionally, Way’s research extends beyond terrorism with religious or 
political underpinnings, as he is also interested in financially-motivated illicit activities, 
such as narco-terrorism and arms trafficking.  The broader scope of his research 
necessitates the limitation of his work to geo-physical factors such as terrain and 
climate. Social variables are generally addressed on superficial levels, consisting of 
easily quantifiable attributes as state boundaries and population densities. This reduction 
is necessary, as the increased variation among actors reduces the number of common 
variables available for consideration.   
 
A variable that Way labels “governance” is the most interesting factor from a social 
science perspective. He defines this as “…the ability of a nation to control its people.” 
(Way, 2003)  Way describes this factor as the most difficult one he assesses in his 
research. GIS analyses involve applied mathematical techniques and thus require 
quantitative data.  Way assigns a numeric value to each country’s “governance” in the 
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interest of quantifying a contributing factor that is essentially qualitative. However, this 
appears to be the sole qualitative factor under consideration, and he does not describe 
his methodology.  
 
In their work entitled Modeling the Co-evolution of Networks and Behavior, Snijders, 
Steglich, and Schweinberger (2007) model alcohol consumption among adolescent 
friends.  They develop a statistical methodology for expressing the relationship between 
the behavior of individuals and the social structure within which they are positioned.  The 
methodology accommodates actor and social group as joint dependent variables and 
recognizes the evolutionary nature of this relationship. It is a promising methodological 
basis for portions of the proposed research because it not only considers actors within 
their social context, but also considers assimilation patterns.  The availability of potential 
new members is a possible contributing factor to the group’s selection of a site location. 
 
Interestingly, techniques developed to assess tree stand patterns may hold even greater 
potential than those used by behaviorists. In Incorporating both Geographical Space and 
Attribute Space into the Kernel Weighting Function of Geographically Weighted 
Regression, Haijin Shi, Lianjun Zhang, and Jianguo Liu (2005) present a kernel 
weighting function incorporating geographical space with what they call “attribute space”.  
This function was developed to study the cluster arrangements of tree species, but it can 
likely be applied to express spatial arrangements of ethnic group concentrations.  
 
The kernel bandwidth function assigns weights to individual trees based on their 
distance from a specified point, which can be either a tree cluster point or, for the 
purposes of this proposed research, an ethnic neighborhood. The function decreases in 
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weight as the distance increases, so that individuals further away from focal points (or 
clusters) are less influenced by them.  Thus, the spatial weighting function is expressed 
as the exponential decay of the distance (d) with respect to the kernel bandwidth (h): 
 
The kernel bandwidth is the region within which the correlation exists. This region can be 
defined in terms of geographical space or attribute space (such as income bracket or 
education).  The use of an exponential form is a reasonable starting point for depicting 
the behavior of geographical space with respect to a selected attribute, as it models the 
proportional change in related variables. In the context of the proposed research, 
discrepancies between modeled and actual behavior may indicate that either the 
relationship does not entail constant proportionality, or that an additional variable 
influences the actor’s behavior.  A third possibility concerns the data itself, but this form 
of equation serves as a reasonable starting point from which to develop a more refined 
model. 
 
The attribute weighting function incorporates the function ƒ(τ) which for Shi, et al., 
represents the difference τ between the focal tree and the surrounding trees. The 
resulting equation becomes                         
 
 
The regression model developed for this dissertation research uses the kernel 
bandwidth function included in the ESRI ArcGIS environment. 
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The kernel bandwidth algorithm defines the area around input points within which the 
coefficient values are determined. For this model, the input points are the geographic 
coordinates of the event locations. The area constitutes the default search radius, or 
kernel bandwidth.   
The bandwidth is defined by obtaining the mean center of the event points. The 
distances between the mean centers are measured to obtain the median of all the 
distances (Dm). These results are the basis for calculating the Standard Distance (SD). 
The Standard Distance is a single statistic that summarizes the distances that the event 
locations deviate from the mean center of the event locations. 
These values are applied to the following formula: 
𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑒𝑒𝐾𝐾 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐾𝐾𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵ℎ = 0.9 × 𝑚𝑚𝐵𝐵𝐾𝐾�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆,� 1
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(2) × 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚� × 𝐾𝐾−0.2 
Where n is the number of event locations. 
 
The identification of current and potential safe-house locations requires an in-depth 
evaluation of both geographical and social factors on micro- and macro- levels.  
Demographic datasets from INSEE, Eurostat, Data.gouv.fr, and Pew Research provided 
the basis for incorporating social and political variables into the model. Geospatial 
factors such as the types of roads, neighborhoods, and meeting places were considered 
for inclusion in the model. Though these factors were excluded for a variety of reasons 
(explained in later sections of this text) from this model, but might well be included were 
this model applied to a different test case—or country. Thus, the variable sets are 
contextual. Some variables might be influential in France, but have no effect or be 
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irrelevant to another country. For instance, local politics might affect daily life far more 
than national politics if a central government is weak, or if the political structure dictates 
that administration be more diffuse than centralized. Road density might be 
inconsequential if the region under study has a robust network throughout.  
 
Gennip, et al (2012) incorporated geographic data with social data to test if the addition 
of geographic data improved the accuracy of a model they developed to identify street 
gang communities.  Their model was designed for cases with limited geosocial data, and 
used a spectral clustering algorithm  to build network graphs to identify Los Angeles 
street gang communities.  
 
Their analysis was based on data obtained from LAPD field interviews of 748 suspected 
and confirmed gang members living in high-density gang areas. Graph edge weighting 
was based on geosocial similarity between the connecting nodes representing the 
interview subjects. To increase the accuracy of the clustering algorithm, Gennip et al. 
included connections within gangs to add ground truth noise and thus increase graph 
edges (connections that reflect social relationships).  
 
The edge weighting algorithm,  
 
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = ∝ 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +  (1−∝)𝑒𝑒−𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗2 𝜎𝜎2⁄  
 
incorporates the Euclidian distance between the average stop locations for nodes i and j. 
The variable σ is one standard deviation larger than the mean distance between nodes 
representing individuals who were stopped together. Gennip et al found that the σ value 
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tended to be constant (1000 feet), enabling the mean distance between i and j to be 
substituted for σ. They selected the Gaussian distance kernel at the scale to match most 
social interactions in the dataset and based the design of the social similarity coefficient 
on the assumption that individuals stopped together share an amicable relationship. 
Social similarity was expressed using a Boolean matrix where Ai,j = 1 if i = j, meaning 
that individuals i and j were stopped together. In all other cases Ai,j = 0. Social and 
geographic weighting can be incorporated by setting the Boolean α parameter, where 
zero designates that only geographic information be considered, and a value of one 
designates exclusive use of social information.  
 
Gennip et al. applied spectral clustering to the graph to obtain 31 clusters, based on 
LAPD assessment that 31 gangs operate in the area. Their spectral clustering technique 
applies the k-means algorithm to the first 31 eigenvectors of the normalized affinity 
matrix to obtain binary approximations to indicator functions for the clusters. The k-
means algorithm develops the clusters by iteratively grouping the nodes with their 
nearest centroids. 
 
According to Gennip et al., in the gang communities studied, the geographic stability of 
gang territories enhanced the accuracy of the analysis, even though data was sparse 
and connections could extend beyond the policing area. These characteristics are 
shared by France’s northern African and middle-eastern immigrant communities, as they 
developed over generations and are thus geographically stable, and their communities 
do not conform strictly to policing districts.  
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Data was too coarse to incorporate this spectral clustering technique into the dissertation 
model. Higher data granularity, such as addresses of event locations and addresses 
associated with suspects’ residences—could identify other extremists and indicate other 
potential safe-house locations if network analysis could be integrated with the 
geographically weighted regression model. This could be achieved by incorporating 
metrics generated by the algorithm as regression variables in the GWR model.  
 
Ordinary Least Squares Linear Regression Analysis 
 
Model testing began with Exploratory Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression to 
obtain the OLS model with the best fit without considering the impact of geography. The 
OLS regression model using the variable combination with the closest fit was compared 
with a Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) model that used the same variable 
set. Comparison of the models demonstrated that the most accurate regression model 
incorporated geographic weighting and provided the basis for the analysis of the 
regression results. 
 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis—Linear Regression analysis—uses least squares 
to determine how a set of independent variables can best predict the behavior of a 
dependent variable.  
 
OLS produces a linear equation that incorporates the independent variable coefficients 
and returns dependent variable values. The returned values are compared with the 
dataset of observed dependent variable values to assess the accuracy—or fit—of the 
33 
 
regression model by squaring and averaging the distances from the data points to the 
line. The least squared value—shortest distance from the line—is used to construct the 
regression line. This technique is limited, as it produces a linear model and assumes 
constant variance among the error estimates for each measure. It does not incorporate 
temporal, or spatial variations of the datapoints. This type of regression analysis was 
conducted before the geographically weighted regression analysis, firstly, to evaluate 
which candidate variables should be included in the model and, secondly, to compare 
the results of both regression techniques to assess the relevance of including a spatial 
component in the analysis. 
 
Exploratory Regression Analysis to Identify Optimal Model 
 
Exploratory regression analysis is a necessary precursor to conducting OLS analysis 
when the behavior and impact of multiple candidate variables on an independent 
variable is not well understood. Exploratory OLS tests multiple candidate variables to 
determine which combination of coefficients produces an equation whose dependent 
variable output most closely resembles the observed data. This technique also identifies 
multicollinearity that must be eliminated to accurately evaluate each variable’s 
contribution to the model. Multicollinearity—correlation between candidate coefficients—
prevents successful assessment of each variable’s influence on the dependent variable. 
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Exploratory Regression Analysis Candidate Variables 
 
Data and time constraints limited the choice and number of variables under 
consideration. Variable selection was based on social science literature, dataset 
availability, and the goal of analyzing research results in a timely manner. Candidate 
variables that were considered but not included in the exploratory regression are 
discussed in the section, “Factors Excluded from the Regression Analysis”. Variables 
were excluded for a variety of reasons that are explained in depth in that section and 
that generally relate to the unavailability of a dataset or an analytic assessment that, 
while a variable might affect candidacy of an area as a safe-house location, that variable 
is not applicable to France.  
 
Central to this realization is the caveat that the geographically weighted regression 
model presented in this research is not a global model. One should not simply insert 
another country’s equivalent datasets and expect to generate a regression model with a 
good fit, even if that model is geographically weighted. Variations in government 
structure, the catalogue of factors that comprise the social environment, and 
characteristics of geographic terrain that shape the geostrategic and social 
environments, can necessitate the incorporation of variables that are not applicable to 
France’s situation. Every region is unique in this sense. The variables excluded in this 
model might be critical to a model designed for a different region.  In quantitative models 
of social science phenomena, especially those with a geospatial component, dataset 
exclusions are often related to the data itself. The dataset might not be designed such 
that it can be incorporated into a model. Different scales, formats, date ranges, and 
levels of granularity represent a small sample of the obstacles that a social scientist or 
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geospatial analyst might encounter in the course of his or her research. The 
methodology however, is widely applicable, and in this sense the geographically 
weighted multi-variate regression model presented here can serve as a foundation for 
the design of similar models for other geographic regions. 
 
The variables included in the exploratory regression are the percentage of graduate 
degree holders per departmental arrondissement in 2008, GINI standard of living index 
per department in 2008, percentage of Algerian-Moroccan-Tunisian-Turkish immigrants 
in 2011, percentage ethnic North African and middle eastern representation in municipal 
government in 2008, burglaries per department in 2008, presence of one or more 
Sensitive Urban Zones (ZUS) per arrondissement,11 percentage of unemployed per 
department in 2008, percentage of population aged 15-64 with only primary school 
education by departmental arrondissement in 2008, and declared taxable revenue per 
departmental arrondissement in 2008. 
 
The graphs below show correlations between each candidate variable considered in the 
exploratory regression models and arrest/raid events.  
                                                
11 Please see section, “Proximity to Sensitive Urban Zones” for explanation of ZUS. 
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Figure 1. Scatterplots for Candidate Variables vs. Events12 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12“Event” is a datapoint that references the residence of an arrested terrorist suspect or the 
location of a raid site.  
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Table 1. Summary of OLS Results 
Variable Coefficient 
[a] 
Std.  
Error 
t-
Statistic 
Probability 
[b] 
Robust 
SE 
Robust 
T 
Robust 
Pr 
[b] 
Variance 
Inflation 
Factor [c] 
Intercept 0.002409 0.033344 0.072243 0.942436 0.035566 0.06773 0.946026 -------- 
Graduates -0.016031 0.003202 -5.00726 0.000001* 0.005089 -
3.15029 
0.001785
* 
1.594625 
Burglaries 0.000033 0.00001 3.396878 0.000774* 0.00002 1.66080 0.09767 1.642839 
Income 0.000019 0.000001 20.36246 0.000000* 0.000002 8.07699 0.000000
* 
1.345643 
 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Diagnostics 
 
Table 2. OLS Diagnostic Statistics Summary 
Input Features: Observed Events 
Number of Observations: 350 
Multiple R-Squared [d]: 0.613722 
Joint F-Statistic [e]: 183.242935 
Joint Wald Statistic [e]: 87.004074 
Koenker (BP) Statistic [f] 53.176187 
Jarque-Bera Statistic [g]: 2860.941648 
Dependent Variable: EVENTS  
Akaike's Information Criterion (AICc) [d]: 243.804925  
Adjusted R-Squared [d]: 0.610373  
Model Variables -PRCGRADDEG +INCOME_2008  +BURG2008 
 
 
Testing Auto-Correlation for OLS Multivariable Regression Analysis 
 
A Morans I spatial correlation test was performed against the multi-variable OLS model 
prior to conducting geographically weighted regression to evaluate clustering distribution 
of deviating predictions. If the error terms are randomly distributed, the variables are 
38 
 
likely sufficiently explaining the observed data, and it is unlikely that a crucial variable is 
omitted from the model.  
 
Selected Parameters: 
Input field: Standard Residual 
Conceptualization of Spatial Relationships: INVERSE_DISTANCE 
 
I selected the inverse distance method because social phenomena do not behave 
discretely--nearby features and phenomena have a mutual influence. It is a safe 
assessment that for this research, the distant features have a reduced impact on each 
other. The inverse distance method estimates a point’s predicted attribute value from the 
weighted average of the values of proximate points. The value weights are inversely 
related to the distance between the prediction and the samples, and are modified by a 
constant power parameter p.  As p increases, the distant weights decrease and reach 
zero, and at very high p values only the nearest points weight the prediction. If p = 0, the 
prediction will be the mean of all the neighboring data values. The inverse distance 
squared weighted interpolation sets p = 2. It is ArcGIS’s default value and was the 
selected parameter for this analysis.    
 
Distance method: Euclidean  
Standardization: None 
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The results appear below: 
 
Geographically weighted regression was conducted to determine if there might be a 
spatial component that would cause an independent variable’s influence to change 
depending on location. Below is an explanation of the parameters selected for the GWR 
analysis. 
 
Bandwidth and Kernel type 
 
AICc (Akaike Information Criterion) Bandwidth: For this analysis, AICc was used to 
facilitate analysis of multiple regression models. AICc estimates the information loss that  
results from using a given model to predict the behavior of the observed data. It is purely 
a comparative metric, so there is no typical value range for any field of research or type 
 
 
Figure 2. Spatial autocorrelation and global Moran's I statistical summaries 
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of regression model. The lowest AICc value among the candidate models reflects the 
model with the least information loss of all the models under consideration. 
 
The AICc value can be used to determine the optimal number of neighbors for the 
estimations.  For this analysis, AICc bandwidth units were determined using an adaptive 
Kernel setting, since feature class density varied throughout the geographic space. 
 
GWR and OLS results appear below: 
 
Table 3. Comparison of OLS and GWR statistics 
Measure OLS GWR 
Neighbors  64 
Residual Squares    24.287611477887584 
Effective Number   63.974417936184381 
Sigma (estimated standard 
deviation of the residuals) 
 0.29140027981237099 
AICc 243.804925  178.58006025877796 
R2  0.613722 0.76514907676923771 
R2Adjusted  0.610373 0.71344181308492494 
 
 
The OLS model had an AICc value of 243.805, whereas the GWR model had an AIC of 
178.580, an indication that the geographically weighted regression model would be a 
better fit than the ordinary least squares model. 
 
The OLS model’s adjusted R-squared value is 0.61, lower than the adjusted R-squared 
value of.71 in the GWR model. 
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V.  Geographically Weighted Regression—Model Variables 
 
The geographically weighted regression analysis incorporates three variables as model 
coefficients—income, burglary and graduate degree holders. The income coefficient is 
based on the total declared household income per department in 2008. The burglary 
coefficient is based on the percentage of burglaries per overall population aged 15-64 
per department in 2008. The graduate degree coefficient is based on the percentage of 
graduate degree holders per population aged 15-64 per department in 2008. 
 
 
Figure 3. Map Showing Local R Squared Coefficient Strengths 
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The local R squared map shows how closely the model adheres to the observed data—
the darker the color, the more closely the model fits the observed events. The lightest 
shade—corresponding to a local R squared value below .50—reflects those areas where 
the model predictions are no better than chance occurrences.  As shown in the map, the 
model accuracy varies spatially.  For this reason, geographically weighted regression 
analysis was favored over ordinary least squares regression analysis, which does not 
consider spatial variability.13  A comparison of model statistics provides quantitative 
evidence that GWR produces a more accurate model. 
 
The model fits best (71 to 87%) in the southeastern and southwestern regions. Roughly 
speaking, the regions are analogous to Provence Alpes-Cote-d’Azure, Midi-Pyrenees, 
Languedoc-Roussillon, and Aquitaine, and south-western Bourgogne in central-east. 
The region with the weakest fit is a north central to north eastern region that stretches 
down to the center west to Poitou-Charente and Limousin. Later sections will examine 
why this region is a poor fit. 
 
Household Income 
 
The income coefficient reflects the total taxable household income per departmental 
arrondissement in 2008.   
A body of academic research concludes that extremists tend to be located in poorer 
areas or areas where there is less policing which also tend to be lower income. 
                                                
13 Rejected OLS and GWR models appear in the appendix. 
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Researchers such as Townsend, Niebuhr, and Fields, examine the influence of 
individual factors on radicalization. Proponents of theories that low education, low 
opportunity, and low income correlate with radicalization tend to deconstruct one or more 
terrorist activities and equate aspects of the extremism with other anti-social behaviors. 
For example, the violence and illicit fund-raising activities associated with terrorism are 
seen as criminal acts. 
The tendency to lump terrorist activities with “conventional” crime is fueled by revelations 
that terrorists and organized crime groups sometimes cross paths and even work 
together. Garry Reid, deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and 
combating terrorism informed the Senate Armed Services Committee’s emerging threats 
and capabilities subcommittee that terrorists are employing criminal tactics to finance 
their operations and in some cases, have formally cooperated to achieve a common 
end. (Parrish, 2012) 
Though there is sometimes a functional overlap, designating terrorism as a criminal type 
can hinder analysis, primarily because extremists and criminals do not share the same 
motivations. Thus, crime theory alone is not an adequate mechanism with which to 
understand radicalization.  
Other theorists highlight the apparent self-destructive, high-risk behavior associated with 
terrorism—especially suicide terrorism—and apply psychological theories that 
characterize terrorism as desperate actions perpetrated by those who believe they have 
nothing to live for. Ellen Townsend (Townsend, 2007) asks if terrorists are suicidal. 
Niebuhr (1960) notes that politically-motivated self-immolators commit suicide to elicit 
sympathy from others, and do not aim to kill others in the process. Individuals who 
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commit these acts generally object to being characterized as performing a suicidal act. 
They view their action as ijtihad, sacrificing their lives to Allah—not as self-immolation. 
According to Fields, et al (2002) (Fields, Elbedour, & Hein, 2002)14 interviews of families 
of suicide attackers, most family members characterized them as deeply religious. This 
is not generally a quality shared by others who self-immolate under emotional 
depression. In fact, empirical research reveals that religiosity often prevents one from 
committing suicide, because most religions forbid it.15 While many of those who attempt 
suicide cite a desire to escape a painful situation, the majority of suicide attackers cite 
harm visited upon them or their relatives as a motivation.16 
 
In addition to the analytic errors associated with attempts to understand radicalization 
within inappropriate frameworks, deconstruction itself is a risky analytic technique when 
applied to social science topics. Integrative approaches can offer more insights because 
they recognize that human behavior is driven by a complex interplay of multimodal 
variables, psychological, historical, and geospatial. Geographically weighted regression 
analysis is one such approach, well-designed interview studies are another.  
 
GWR results indicate that income is positively correlated with events in areas where the 
model shows the strongest predictive power (See map below). This discovery is 
consistent with the findings of other empirical research studies. 
                                                
14 Cited in Townsend. 
 
15Dervic et al. 2004. From Ellen Townsend. 
 
16Kushner, 1996.And Bancroft et al. 1979. Both in Ellen Townsend. 
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Figure 4. Map Showing GWR Coefficient Strength for the Variable, “Household Income”, 
per Department, 2008 INSEE data. 
 
Research on the correlation of wealth with violent extremism (specifically, suicide 
bombers) from the Palestinian territories identified positive links. Berrebi (2003), found 
that Palestinian suicide bombers were rarely from impoverished households. According 
to Berrebi, who studied the biographies of 335 Palestinian terrorists, “…those with higher 
education and higher living standards are more likely to participate in terrorist activity….” 
(Berrebi, 2007, 2) 
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Shafiq and Sinno (2009) examine correlations of income and education—two of the 
geographically weighted regression model coefficients—with an individual’s support for 
suicide bombing attacks on civilians in their countries, and on Western military and 
political personnel in Iraq. Their research is based on 2005 public opinion data from 
residents of Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey.  Comparison of 
their findings is limited to support for attacks on civilians in their home countries. This is 
because support for these attacks might vary due to the attacks occurring far from home 
and are unlikely to affect the respondents or their immediate social groups in the latter 
case. For France, the context of ethnic group support of extremists storing weapons, 
recruiting, and living in their midst more closely resembles the context in which 
respondents are queried on their support of suicide attackers on civilians in their 
residential (home country) environment. Comparison is also limited to two countries—
Turkey and Morocco—as ethnicity data for French departments was unavailable for 
other ethnic groups in Shafiq and Sinno’s study.  Shafiq and Sinno found no significant 
correlation between income and support for suicide bombing.  The areas where the 
GWR’s strongest predictive ability coincides with the highest proportion of Turkish and 
Moroccan populations are Bretagne, Languedoc Roussillon, and western Provence Alps 
Cote d’Azur. 
 
One potential explanation for the observation that safe-houses are more likely to be 
found in wealthier areas is that police might put more energy into fostering positive 
relationships with members of the communities, resulting in a greater willingness on the 
part of residents to support the police. This would result in a better network of informants 
who would notify the police whenever they have reason to believe that extremists are 
stashing weapons or recruiting members. This explanation would also fit the behavior of 
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the burglary coefficient described in the following section, and could be relevant to other 
countries that show similar coefficient behavior-event correlation.  However, this 
explanation does not appear to apply to France, as the section, “Police-Community 
Relationships” details research that counters this conclusion. 
 
Education Beyond College 
 
Though educational level is a predictor in the regression model, the nature of its 
correlation—most notably in high local R2 areas in the south and northeastern areas of 
France—varies with respect to the geographic region (see map below). This variable 
more than any other, demonstrates the importance of incorporating a geographic 
component into the analysis. 
 
48 
 
 
Figure 5. Map Showing GWR Coefficient Strength for the Variable, "Education Beyond 
College", per Department, 2008 INSEE data. 
 
The impact of geography as a determinant is evident from other empirical research, as 
well. Analysis of social, political and historical context provides insight as to why a 
coefficient has a positive or negative influence for a particular ethnic group.  Sinno and 
Shafiq talk about cultural issues associated with extremist sentiment.  
 
Shafiq and Sinno’s research on suicide attackers reveals variations in education, 
depending on the attacker’s country of origin. They find that any correlation between 
education and support for suicide attacks is difficult to detect, as those with limited 
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education were less likely to express their opinion, opting instead to select “don’t 
know/Refused” in answering the questions. 
 
Among those who did answer in Morocco and Turkey, both of which are countries of 
origin for many Muslim immigrants to France, Shafiq and Sinno found no significant 
correlation between education and support for suicide attacks on civilians. GWR analysis 
shows that in departments having the highest proportion of ethnic Turkish and Moroccan 
populations, the education coefficient has the weakest determining influence. Thus, the 
behavior of the GWR and the behavior of its education and income coefficients is 
consistent with Shafiq and Sinno’s observation that education and income are weak 
predictors of support for extremism among Turkish and Moroccan populations.17 
 
In France, Turkish departmental population percentages range from 0.1 percent and 
23.4 percent of the immigrant population. However, Turkish populations tend to be 
concentrated in areas where the model has the weakest fit. A comparatively high Turkish 
population—between 8.1 and 23.4 percent—exists in some areas of the GWR model 
that have a moderately high local R2—between .51 and .70—somewhat high for a social 
science regression model. These upper range R2 areas are: Bretagne (Morbihan), Pays 
de la Loire (Maine-et-Loire), and Rhone-Alpes (Drome). Higher education is negatively 
or positively correlated, or shows no significant correlation, depending on department. In 
                                                
17At time of this research, I was unable to obtain data on France’s ethnic percentages for other 
ethnic groups studied by Shafiq and Sinno. 
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departments where a correlation is present, in Morbihan it is positively correlated, but in 
Maine-et-Loire and Drome it is negatively correlated.18 
Thus, where the model results demonstrate the best fit, there is no significant correlation 
between highly educated Turkish populations and event locations—consistent with 
Shafiq’s and Sinno’s observation of no significant correlation of highly educated 
residents in Turkey with support for suicide bombers. 
                                                
18In the Auvergne region the higher education coefficient is neutral in the north and weakly 
positive in the south. 
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Figure 6. Map Showing Percentage Turkish Ethnicity by Department, 2011 INSEE data. 
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Figure 7. Map Highlighting Departments with Highest Turkish Ethnic Percentages in High 
Local R Squared Areas. 
 
France’s Moroccan departmental population percentages range from 1.9 percent to 42.2 
percent of all immigrants. A comparatively high percentage of ethnic Moroccans—
between 14.9 percent and 42.2 percent—exist in areas where the local R2 is between 
.70 and .87— the upper range of the regression model’s local R2, and thus where it 
demonstrates the best fit. These upper range R2 areas are: Aquitaine (Lot-et-Garonne, 
Gironde), Midi-Pyrenees (Tarn-et-Garonne, Tarn), Auvergne (Haute Loire), Languedoc 
Roussillon (Gard, Aude, Herault), Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (Vaucluse, Bouche du 
Rhone, Var), Rhone Alpes (Drome). Higher education correlation in the Moroccan areas 
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is similar to that of the Turkish areas in that it varies widely. It is positive, negative, or 
shows no significant correlation, depending on the department. In departments where a 
correlation is present, higher education is positively correlated with the probability of an 
arrest/raid location in Aquitaine (Lot-et-Garonne), Midi-Pyrenees (Tarn-et-Garonne, 
Tarn) and Auvergne (Haute Loire), but negatively correlated in Languedoc Roussillon 
(Gard, Herault), Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (Vaucluse, Bouche du Rhone, Var), and 
Rhone Alpes (Drome).  There was no correlation in Aquitaine (Gironde) and Languedoc 
Roussillon (Aude). 
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Figure 8. Map Showing Percentage Moroccan Ethnicity by Department, 2011 INSEE data. 
 
This erratic correlation range for areas with higher Turkish and Moroccan concentration 
explains the exclusion of ethnic concentration as a model variable. According to the 
regression model results, ethnicity—at least among the ethnic groups for which data 
could be included in this research—is not a determining factor for the establishment of a 
safe-house location. These results are consistent with Shafiq and Sinno’s conclusions 
that there is no significant correlation between higher educational attainment with 
support for suicide bombers among Moroccan residents who were surveyed. 
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Figure 9. Map Highlighting Departments with Highest Moroccan Ethnic Percentages in 
High Local R Squared Areas, Showing Graduate Degree Coefficient Chloropeth. 
 
 
Why does higher education’s predictive value vary according to ethnicity? 
Any attempt to answer this question requires an in-depth investigation of the context in 
which these ethnic groups develop, and may or may not be linked to the quality of 
education or the enhanced income opportunities for graduate degree holders in that 
environment. Shafiq and Sinno explain that in Turkey, higher education correlates with 
secular views.  
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There is usually a negative correlation between the percentages of the population aged 
15 to 29 years old with education degrees beyond that of college and the presence of 
events.19  Areas where the correlation is positive are generally areas where the overall 
model is a weak predictor. Taking the model at face value, educated communities 
discourage the establishment of extremist safe-houses. But what mechanism associated 
with higher education exerts this effect?  
 
Professor Kamaldeep Bhui’s (2014) research team at Queen Mary University of London 
interviewed 600 Pakistanis, Bangladeshi, and Muslim people in London and Bradford 
between the ages of 18 and 45. The study found no evidence substantiating a link 
between inequality-related grievances and radicalization. Further, Professor Professor 
Kamaldeep Bhui (Bhui, 2014)  stated to al-Jazeera that his team’s research did not 
reveal, "…what factors make potential recruits open to persuasion to join a terrorist 
movement…”. (Pizzi, 2014)  Similarly, further research is required before one can offer 
insights into why and how advanced education could contribute to radicalization.  Any 
attempts to shed light on this link necessitate speculation, but the GWR results might 
indicate a starting point for such research. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
19 I used 29 as the cut-off year because the next age bracket included everyone over the age of 
30. I was concerned that inclusion of the over-70 population might skew the data. The over-70 
population includes generations where undergraduate degrees might have been valued 
differently, be it changing educational standards or different degree requirements necessary for 
gaining desirable employment. 
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Answering the Why—Income and Education Through the Lens of GINI 
 
A possible explanation for the positive influence of higher education on the 
establishment of extremist safe-houses might be found from examining the GINI 
Standard of Living Index.  The GINI Standard of Living Index measures levels of 
inequality among living standards. It does not measure the quality of the living standard 
itself, but rather the disparity of living standards within a specific area. For example, a 
GINI living index of zero reflects a perfect equality among residents, but does not 
indicate whether or not that living standard is high or low.  
 
Relative Deprivation Theory posits a positive correlation between high education and 
violent behaviors (such as crime and terrorism). A logical extension of the theory is that 
terrorism tends to develop in areas where there is a stark contrast in living standards, 
because those less fortunate are regularly exposed to the trappings of the higher class, 
and thus there are constant reminders that they are less well-off.  Ted Robert Gurr 
(1970) writes of this theory in Why Men Rebel, in which he explains that the gap 
between expected and achieved welfare generates violence born of frustration when 
individuals see no way to attain the lifestyle they feel they deserve. One would expect 
this frustration to be more acute if an individual follows societal rules and acquires an 
advanced degree, only to discover additional obstacles that academic achievement will 
not remove. Thus, proponents of this theory might argue that areas are more at risk to 
hosting a safe-house if there is quality of life disparity, or where those who enjoy a high 
quality of life live near or among those less fortunate.  
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Data note on educational attainment: To address that hypothesis, data on the 
percentage of higher education graduates in 2008 were analyzed with data on 2011 
executive and professional employment. The reasoning for the time gap is to allow three 
years for graduates to obtain and be promoted into executive and professional positions 
commensurate with their education and skill level. Regression with these variables 
produced a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.24. The Durbin-Watson statistic measures the 
correlation between adjacent error terms and returns values between 0 and 4. A Durbin-
Watson statistic close to zero indicates a positive autocorrelation. If the statistic is close 
to 4 the autocorrelation is negative. In this instance, the Durbin-Watson statistic was very 
close to 2, indicating the absence of autocorrelation between those with graduate 
degrees and those holding professional or executive positions. 
 
To gain insight into whether or not Relative Deprivation Theory can explain event 
presence, departments with a high GINI index were examined. Income and higher 
education coefficients were examined for arrondissements within high GINI departments 
that had at least one event. Results supporting this theory would show events in low 
income and low graduate degree areas. In such cases, one explanation would be that 
the living standard disparity is a source of frustration and resentment for those with less 
education who reason that they could not improve their standard of living because they 
lack the education necessary to secure a white-collar position. A different result that 
would also support the theory is the presence of events in arrondissements with low 
income and high graduate degree coefficients. In such cases, the explanation consistent 
with the theory asserts that graduate degree holders in low income areas are vulnerable 
to engaging in anti-social behavior. They have followed societal rules and deferred 
rewards to meet the challenges associated with obtaining a higher education with the 
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intent of bettering their lifestyle. When the graduate degree ceases to show promise of 
opening the door to a profitable career they become disillusioned and anti-social.  
 
GINI indices ranged from 21.13 for Aurillac, Mauriac, and Saint-Flour in Cantal, through 
36.08 for Nanterre in Hauts-de-Seine and 42.23 for Paris.  Departments in the GINI 
index brackets over 28 contained 33 out of the 50 events in this study. In descending 
order and with events in parentheses, they are Paris (9), Bouches-du-Rhône (6), Haute-
Garonne (4), Alpes-Maritimes (3), Hérault (2), Rhône (2), Seine-Saint-Denis (2), Var (1), 
and Vaucluse (1).   These events were not concentrated in low income arrondissements, 
but the distribution does not necessarily eliminate relative deprivation as a driver. In 
areas such as Paris and Lyon (in Rhône), the GINI index might be high within—not just 
among—arrondissements, as high income neighborhoods can abut low income 
neighborhoods. The news reports that serve as the source of the event data rarely 
specified the address of the raid or arrest location, preventing confident assessments as 
to the proportion of events in low income neighborhoods. However, in reports that did 
specify the neighborhood where the events occurred, biographic information in the news 
articles appears to support relative deprivation theory, if only in the context that certain 
raids occurred in low income areas.   
 
For example, in 200220 Mourad Benchellali, his brother Menad, and his father Chellali 
Benchellali (a Muslim cleric) were arrested in 2002 on terrorism charges.  The 
Benchellalis were residents of Venissieux, a low income suburb in Lyon. These arrests 
are not included in the research data because they pre-date the study’s time window that 
                                                
20 Although 2002 falls outside the date range of the regression data, it is temporally proximal and 
thus likely reflects the context of the events within the research data. 
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scopes the analysis to events occurring between 2008 and 2012. However, the 2002 
arrest provides weight to the argument that the Lyon events appearing in this study 
might well have occurred in low income neighborhoods. This is especially true given the 
recent arrests in 2014, when two teenage girls—one a resident of Venissieux—were 
arrested for planning to bomb the Great Synagogue of Lyon.21 
 
Another example is Marseille (in Bouches-du- Rhône). Marseille appears as a high 
income, high GINI area, when in reality it contains both high and low income 
neighborhoods.  Two arrests in 5 October 2010 reportedly occurred in southeastern 
Marseille, but even this is not sufficient granularity to determine whether or not the 
suspects lived in a low income neighborhood. 
 
Since nearly 2/3 of the events occurred in high GINI index departments, a high GINI 
index would appear to be an influential variable but it never appeared as a coefficient in 
the strongest models over multiple iterations of OLS and GWR analyses.  GINI could 
actually be a weaker determinant than income or crime because while most events 
occur in high GINI areas, enough events appear in very low GINI areas to weaken the 
influence of the index as a coefficient, and some high GINI departments do not have 
event occurrences, though this cannot be said without caveat based on the small sample 
size and the narrow time frame of analysis. It is possible that relative deprivation is a 
driver only when other factors are in play, such as high education coupled with high 
income. However, lack of specific information on the locations of many of the events 
prevents a confident assessment of this variable’s impact. 
                                                
21 The other girl resided in Tarbes, Hautes-Pyrenees. 
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It is possible that in France, lower income neighborhoods in high GINI areas are 
vulnerable to developing safehavens for advocates of violent extremism. This could be 
true for other nations, but the impact of the coefficient combination of high education, 
high income, somewhat lower crime coefficient, and high GINI index might not be as 
potent if other variables have sufficient strength to significantly impact the model.  
The graph below shows the correlation of events with a combined income-percentage 
graduate degree holders coefficient for arrondissements and other district types within 
departments having GINI indices of 28 or higher. Paris and Marseille data are excluded 
from the graph due to the lack of location granularity. Most of the news articles reporting 
Paris and Marseille raids did not specify the arrondissement, and both cities contain 
many districts of widely varying income levels.  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Number of Events and Corresponding GINI Indices of Departments. 
 
The coefficient behavior is erratic for GINI indices below 36, but beyond 36, the trend 
generally increases.   
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Impact of High Education and High Income—Getting to the Why 
 
A 2014 Queen Mary University of London research study links wealth, full-time 
education, and youth with radicalization and in so doing, corroborates the geographically 
weighted regression research in this dissertation. Professor Kamaldeep Bhui’s (Bhui, 
2014) research team interviewed 600 Pakistanis, Bangladeshi, and Muslim people in 
London and Bradford between the ages of 18 and 45. Sympathy for violent ideologically-
motivated protests and terrorist activity was highest among those under 20 who were 
unemployed full-time students. Sympathy levels were also highest in the sample portion 
that earned over £75,000 per year. The study identified those in the pre-radicalization 
stage, a point in the radicalization process where intervention measures are likely to 
prevent an individual’s transition to a rigid extremist mindset. 22 
Nasra Hassan (Hassan, 2001) interviewed approximately 250 Palestinian extremists 
from 1996 to 1999.  All the individuals interviewed either had attempted suicide 
missions, their family members, or mission trainers. According to Hassan, none of the 
would-be suicide attackers were poor or uneducated. Most were middle class, 
employed, and in the case of two volunteers, children of millionaires. Hanadi Jaradat 
came from a well-to-do Palestinian family and graduated law school before dying via 
suicide attack on a Haifa restaurant in 2003 (Victor, Raising a Generation of Martyrs, 
2003). 
The “why” is challenging to address. Even with additional, in-depth, interview-based 
studies motivation is difficult to determine, given that subjects might not be forthcoming 
                                                
22 Kamaldeep Bhui, Professor of Cultural Psychiatry & Epidemiology, Queen Mary University 
London. 
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in their responses, and their root motivations might not be clear to themselves. Azam 
(2010) suggests that higher education often requires young people to move far from their 
families, and they become vulnerable to social pressure as they strive to replace 
loosened family ties with other social connections that are familial in nature. These 
young, highly educated people might be vulnerable to stronger personalities who 
encourage them to replace links to their biological families with those of a new, extremist 
family. 
Marc Sageman (2004) reaches a similar conclusion, based on interviews and 
biographical studies of 172 jihadists. Although a majority (approximately 60%) of his 
subjects received a minimum of some college education, their education was secular—
most often in the physical sciences. They rarely, if ever, had a background in theology. 
He notes several extremist leaders—Qutb, Faraj, al-Zawahiri—were not religious clerics. 
The regression analysis in this study does not subdivide education into disciplines. 
Additionally, the sample size (50 events) is too small to enable quantitative analysis 
using subdivisions of the graduate education variable. 
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Crime 
 
Crime data is represented by burglary percentage of population per department (INSEE, 
2008 data).  INSEE stores data on burglaries, vehicle thefts, robberies, and murders at 
department-level granularity. The inclusion of crime-related datasets produced 
autocorrelation errors in the exploratory regression model, as the data increased and 
decreased similarly among the datasets. The burglary dataset was selected because the 
regression analysis required that single representative dataset for criminal activity. 
Burglary numbers were normalized as percentages of the population per department. 
The burglary chloropeth map appears to depict a positive correlation between burglaries 
and events.  
 
However, the burglary coefficient map (shown below) appears to indicate an inverse 
correlation, as it depicts events occurring in blue areas in the region where the local R2 
values are strongest. So how can burglaries negatively correlate with events when the 
burglary event map appears to show a positive correlation? The answer might lie in the 
manner in which the coefficients temper each other’s influence within the model.  
 
To better understand the behavior of the burglary coefficient, geographically weighted 
regression was conducted using only burglary percentages as an independent variable. 
The map below depicts the influence of this coefficient on predicting safe-house 
locations.  
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Figure 11. Map Showing GWR Coefficient Strength for the Variable, “Crime” (Burglary 
Percentages per Population), per Department, 2008 INSEE data. 
 
When considered in isolation, the burglary coefficient has banded regions and degrees 
of influence (shown in map below), and generally, this coefficient positively correlates 
with event locations where the local R2 if the multi-variable model is strongest. The 
burglary coefficient does not exert this effect in the multi-variable model, because other 
coefficients come into play to adjust the weight of the burglary coefficient.  The inclusion 
of the other variables contributes significantly to the model’s accuracy, as the single 
coefficient GWR model has an adjusted R2 value of only 0.174, indicating that burglaries 
only explain 17.4% of the likelihood of an event occurring in a predicted location.  
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Figure 12. Map Showing GWR Coefficient Strength for the Variable, “Crime” (Burglary 
Percentages per Population) in a Single Variable Regression Analysis, 2008 INSEE data. 
 
The burglary coefficient’s weak predictive ability is shown in the scatterplot below by the 
datapoints indicating that there are multiple departments with high burglary rates but no 
events. 
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Figure 13. Scatterplot Showing Weak Correlation between Burglaries and Events per 
Department 
 
Examination of the low burglary-high raid correlation could also provide insight as to why 
safe-houses were discovered in high income as well as low income arrondissements in 
high GINI areas. Sharp income disparities within arrondissements that obscure the 
actual income level of a raid location might be one explanation. This explanation could 
neither be verified nor ruled out, because the raid reports rarely listed the raid location 
with sufficient granularity to make an assessment.  
 
An alternative explanation for the occasionally inverse correlation between burglaries 
and raid locations concerns law enforcement’s relationships with the communities they 
serve.  This explanation posits that police have a greater and more consistent presence 
in high income communities, resulting in lower burglary rates. They might also have a 
less adversarial relationship with residents, given that burglary and robbery suspects 
usually live outside those communities, thus police are often conducting unpleasant 
interviews elsewhere. The less adversarial relationship might translate into a more 
informative one, where residents feel comfortable reporting suspicious activity. 
Therefore, police might have superior intelligence networks in higher income 
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communities, as residents more readily come forward to tell the police when they hear of 
or see something suspicious, and their information yields successful raids.  
 
This explanation implies that there might be undiscovered safe-houses in other high 
burglary departments, but we are not aware of them because the residents rarely 
volunteer information to the police. If this explanation is correct, the fact that events are 
clustered in a few high burglary departments implies that we might discover more safe-
houses if police had better intelligence in these areas.  
 
Police-Community Relationships 
 
Research on community policing and communities’ relationships with local law 
enforcement in France does not support the hypothesis that more raids in lower crime 
communities is a reflection of a better community relationship generating a better 
intelligence network.  The French government has improved local law enforcement-
community relationships as a result of a 30-year effort to encourage cooperation 
between the two sectors, elements of 19th century policing attitudes are still pervasive.  
Rather than seeking to function as partners, each views the other as an outsider. The 
police see themselves as professionals who know their jobs better than anyone else, 
and thus perceive community participation in crafting and implementing policies as 
amateur attempts to usurp their authority. The residents tend to view law enforcement as 
strangers who enter their neighborhoods and demand that they come forward to report 
suspicious activity. The residents also resent police telling their community leaders to 
implement policies that are not tailored to the community’s needs.  French policy-makers 
are well-aware of the sociological, behavioral, and economic factors contributing to crime 
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rates and have implemented initiatives and political structures to address the problem. 
(Jones & Wiseman, 2006) 
 
In 2002, the French parliament directed municipal governments to establish Local 
Security and Crime Prevention Councils, which transferred crime-fighting and crime-
suppression responsibilities to the local communities.  The restructuring of France’s 
security apparatus coincided with a pilot program that provided community policing 
training to local law enforcement officers and interagency outreach teams with 
residential participation. 
 
Unfortunately, while there has been progress, there remains much progress to be made. 
Police continue to design and implement policies without consulting the communities 
they serve, and rarely record or respond to resident complaints. Public meetings 
between law enforcement and residents are not well-attended, and civilians who do 
attend report that they hear crime statistics and directives to report suspicious activity, 
but are not asked for their input. Crime fighting policies continue to be designed and 
implemented with a top-down approach, rather than through a cooperative relationship.  
 
However, this tense relationship is not limited to one class or community—it appears to 
affect white-collar, blue-collar, and immigrant communities.  
 
Arthur A. Jones and Robin Wiseman (2006) argue that the adversarial environment 
creates “no-go zones” that police avoid. They assert that these are high crime areas with 
immigrant youth populations that feel marginalized and ignored because police won’t 
enter to maintain order and stability. They also assert that these youth have formed 
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terrorist cells within these zones. However, the regression models evaluated in this 
research show no significant correlation with Sensitive Urban Zones (ZUS)—the so-
called “no-go” zones—and North African and middle-eastern immigrant populations. 
Further, the regression models show no significant correlation of arrest/raid events with 
areas of proportionately high ethnic Muslim populations. These findings comport with 
those of Finney and Simpson (2006), whose research on UK terrorist suspects’ 
geographic origins shows that “…Muslims charged with terrorism under UK legislation 
are no more likely to come from districts where the proportion of Muslims are highest, 
than from other districts.” (Finney & Simpson, 2006). Many of the 752 ZUS do not have 
proportionally significant North African and Middle Eastern populations. Furthermore, the 
regression analyses revealed no significant correlation of the presence of a ZUS with an 
arrest or raid event. Lastly, Jones and Wiseman provide no evidence of terrorist youth 
gangs in these zones. If they do have quantifiable information, French law enforcement 
officials would likely welcome the information.  
 
Coefficient Behavior in High Local R2 Areas 
 
The first aspect of this analysis focuses on areas where the Local R2 shows the best 
model fit—the southern and then the northwestern region in Pays de la Loire. The 
southern areas show a weak positive correlation between burglaries and events, 
negative correlations between income and events, but a mix of positive and negative 
correlation with respect to the correlation between graduate degree holders and events. 
This behavior counters much of the conventional wisdom in security studies theory. 
Keeping in mind that correlation does not necessarily mean causation, insights into 
these coefficients might be gleaned from an examination of the events recorded in these 
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areas. Every incident with the exception of one event in Albi occurred in Toulouse. 
Several arrests were connected with the investigation into Mohammad Merah, and 17 
arrests were connected to suspected followers of Forsane Alizza chief Mohamed 
Achamlane.23 
 
In Toulouse, income and education coefficients exert a weak positive influence on event 
probability, but crime exerts a weak negative influence. According to the model, the 
more education and income a Toulouse resident has, the higher the probability the 
resident will tolerate or support a haven for extremists. The chloropeth map of average 
household income by per department highlights the economic contrast of Toulouse with 
the surrounding departments. 
 
                                                
23Bruguière provides details on the various networks active at the time in Jean-Louis Bruguière 
and Jean-Marie Pontaut, Ce Que Je N’ai Pas Pu Dire, (Paris: Laffont, 2009), pp.443-463. 
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Figure 14. Average Declared Departmental Household Income, INSEE 2008 Data. 
 
However, it would be premature to make the analytic leap that in Toulouse, the wealthier 
a resident is, the more likely he is to look out the window over an evening glass of merlot 
and observe his neighbors unloading strange cargo. The news articles reporting on 
terrorism-associated raids in Toulouse did not provide detailed location information, so at 
the time of this research, I was unable to determine exactly where in Toulouse these 
raids occurred. The events could have occurred in low-income areas because Toulouse 
has a high GINI index. The wealthier residents of that department drive up the income 
level, but there are also areas that are much less well-off, sometimes in close proximity 
to upper income neighborhoods. 
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Toulouse contains gated communities that exist side by side with low-income 
neighborhoods. Residents on opposite ends of the income spectrum often live in close 
proximity, yet are highly segregated.  They shop in different stores and do not typically 
cross paths. The department is has also grown very rapidly over the past 10 years. 
Although job opportunities for business executives have increased, blue collar jobs and 
independent contractor opportunities in Toulouse are shrinking. 
 
The social segregation and gating of communities is driven by security concerns on the 
part of those living in the upper income areas. Robert Monné, CEO of Monné-Ducroix, a 
major developer of gated communities in Toulouse, explains that while people value 
security, no city has the resources to provide complete security, gated communities can 
bring residents peace of mind. The transition to gated communities follows the American 
model. For Americans, this choice is consistent with a nation that is largely capitalist and 
unabashedly multi-class. In France, it can seem a bit incongruous and hard to justify for 
more socialist-minded populations. As new residents of one of the Toulouse gated 
communities explained to a journalist covering the trend, ‘Even if we still vote for the 
Communist party and are against the idea of social segregation, we want to live 
somewhere quiet’. This is not unusual behavior. Monne adds. “…in fact, most of the 
councils where we have located estates are on the left…” (Belmssous, 2002) 
 
Not surprisingly, the positive income coefficient coincides with a positive graduate 
education coefficient, since high education often provides the skills that command higher 
salaries. Unfortunately, without more specific data on where the raids occurred, 
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interpretation of the coefficients’ impact must be tempered to more general analyses, as 
background information on those arrested in connection with the event data points is 
difficult to uncover. 
 
VI. Background of suspected extremists—Do They Fit the Model? 
Some of those arrested do have criminal backgrounds. For example, according to 
French officials, Muhammed Merah, the French national who in 2012 committed several 
terrorism-related killings in Toulouse and Montauban, came from a working class 
neighborhood and had a history of petty crime arrests. Merah was associated with the 
Forsane Alizza network and trained at terrorist camps in Pakistan and Waziristan. Merah 
does not appear to be well-educated or come from a high-income family, though he does 
have a petty criminal history that would be consistent with the generally positive crime 
rate coefficient. 
Another Toulouse-based network was associated with Mohamed Merah, who conducted 
terrorist attacks in March 2012 that resulted in seven deaths, four at a Jewish school in 
Toulouse. This group conducted attacks in southern France, and some group members 
also fought in Syria. (Holman, 2015)  Police charged two group members as Merah’s 
accomplices. One individual was, according to police statement, "a member of the 
traveler community who converted to Islam..." The other group member charged with 
assisting Merah was the traveler’s ex-girlfriend. (Phelan, 2012) 
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Information about the traveler’s educational background and income level was 
unavailable at time of research, but travelers tend to have limited income and education 
in France as well as in Bulgaria and Romania, countries from which many of them 
emigrate. (Chiriac, 2012) Friction between travelers, also called Roma, and government 
authorities has sometimes become violent. In July 2010, French Roma attacked a police 
station, destroyed trees and set cars on fire in the Loire Valley in retaliation for the police 
shooting of a Roma who knocked down a police officer as he drove through a police 
checkpoint in the process. President Sarkozy responded by ordering the dismantling of 
approximately 300 illegal camps within three months. He stated that the camps were 
“…sources of illegal trafficking, of profoundly shocking living standards, of exploitation of 
children for begging, of prostitution and crime". (BBC, 2010) In 2009, authorities 
implemented a mass deportation of Romanian and Bulgarian illegal immigrants, 
expelling them from camping sites throughout the country. (BBC, 2010) 
 
One of the people arrested in a March 2012 raid does not appear to hold an advanced 
degree or to be financially comfortable. Willie Bridgette spent much of his time sharing 
boarding with others, some of whom shared his extremist views. He is now serving a 
nine-year sentence. Forsane Alizza member Willie Brigette lived in Couronnes, a suburb 
in the 11th arrondissement of Paris, converted to Islam and attended mosques and 
Islamic schools with reputations for preaching extremist anti-Western messages. He 
twice deserted the French navy and held a variety of jobs including butcher, social 
worker teacher, and drug rehab counselor. He was twice divorced and had three 
children. Police suspect him of obtaining travel documents for Ahmed Shah Massoud’s 
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assassins. In 2007, he was convicted of planning to attack an Australian nuclear facility. 
(Peterson & Fray, 2004) 
Some of the individuals linked to the event data were well-educated and possibly 
financially comfortable. Rany Arnaud was arrested in December 2008 for planning to 
plant a bomb outside a government building near the Eiffel Tower. Arnaud was educated 
in computer electronics and lived in Val-de-Marne, a moderately well-to-do area just 
outside of Paris. Rany traveled to Syria and made several attempts to join the 
insurgency in Iraq. He eventually joined Algerian radicals. Upon his arrest, he informed 
police that he planned multiple attacks on French soil, including the French Intelligence 
Service headquarters.  Arnaud was arrested with Nadir Badache and Adrien Guihal, two 
suspected co-conspirators. I was unable to find information on the backgrounds of 
Badache or Guihal. 
 
I could find relevant background information for one of the Paris cases—that of Jeremie 
Sidney—though the information was insufficient to provide insight on whether or not the 
case conformed to all three model coefficients. In October 2012, Jeremie Sidney and 
another man threw a grenade at a kosher supermarket in Sarcelles, a Paris suburb. 
Jeremie Sidney was radicalized while in prison for drug trafficking. He joined a jihadist 
group and recruited fighters for the insurgency in Syria. (Hinnant, 2012) Jeremie Sydney 
did not appear to be well-educated or well-to-do, but his case does conform to the model 
in that he has a criminal history. 
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VII.  Factors excluded from the regression analysis 
 
Social Environment—Impact of Ethnicity 
 
In order to assess the impact of factors associated with supportive populations and 
historically marginalized social environments, it is necessary to identify areas with high 
North African and Middle Eastern immigrant populations.  Data on ethnic population 
percentages were included in the exploratory regression analysis to assess their 
correlation with event locations. A high positive correlation would indicate that these 
ethnic communities might be more tolerant of extremist ideas than are areas that have 
other ethnic compositions or predominantly of multi-generational French heritage. 
Extensive searches for GIS and tabular datasets detailing populations of individual 
ethnic groups, immigrant nationalities, and religious populations were not fruitful. INSEE 
maintains datasets on immigrants vs. non-immigrants and French citizens vs. non-
citizens, because France imposes legal restraints on collecting this type of data.  
 
The French government must conform to Article 8, Law number 78-17 (6 January 1978), 
a law that prevents the collection of data on ethnicity and religion on the grounds that the 
collection of such data is an invasion of privacy. The spirit of the law is traced to 
regulations enacted in 1872 that prohibit the government from collecting personal 
information on ethnicity and religious affiliation. (Camilleri, 2012) The most specific 
datasets I was able to find address ethnicity on the department level, giving population 
numbers for first-generation Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, and Turkish immigrants in 
separate fields. I summed these fields and computed the percentage with respect to the 
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total population for that year per department. The result is, hopefully, a reasonably 
accurate representation of the proportion of northern African and Turkish immigrants per 
department.  
 
I also compiled a table that lists the number of mosques per commune, including the 
address and any descriptive notes on the size of the mosque and the theological bent of 
its imam(s). For example, if the imam advocated progressive ideas or strict, unyielding 
interpretation of Islamic laws. I abandoned this compilation because it became 
impossible to determine the theology of many of the mosques. Additionally, it became 
clear that an accurate representation of the concentration of mosques would be 
daunting, and its accuracy impossible to verify.  
 
Societal Membership—and the Political Voice 
 
Support of the head scarf ban was much stronger among the broader French population 
(69%), and may indicate a significant risk factor that is much harder to quantify in a 
model—societal membership. Researchers from Sorbonne University and University of 
California, San Diego, and Stanford University found that job applicants with an 
ethnically Muslim name were 2.5 times less likely to receive calls to interview for a 
position than were candidates with comparable CVs but non-ethnically Muslim names. 
Researchers controlled for regional differences, employment sector, company size, 
occupation, contract type, and whether or not the CV included a photograph. 
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If societal membership is an inverse risk factor, then how might we quantify it for a 
model? One metric might be Muslim representation in local politics. The table compiled 
for this research records the proportion of council members of possible North African or 
Middle Eastern ethnicity in the commune they represent. Representation is difficult to 
quantify, as representatives are not required to identify themselves as Muslim. 
Therefore, the numbers are determined based on the council member’s name.  
 
The relationship between the percentage of local council representatives of North 
African or Middle Eastern ethnicity and the number of arrests/raids in those areas 
between 2008 and 2012 is expressed in an R2 value of .0295.  The graph below shows 
the relationship between events and ethnic representation on the municipal level. There 
appears to be no linear relationship, but the graph will be regenerated after the datasets 
are verified for accuracy. 
 
 
Figure 15. Number of Events and Percentage Middle-Eastern and North African Municipal 
Representation in 2008. 
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Outlier Communes 
 
Aubervilliers is an outlier in the data, in that the commune has the highest ethnic 
representation of any of the communes in the dataset, yet there was one event within its 
boundaries. However, removing it from the dataset did not have much impact on the 
correlation. Recalculation after removing the outlier still returns a weak correlation. Thus, 
based on these metrics, there is a very weak correlation between social representation, 
at least in the political arena, and the presence of safe-houses. 
 
Proximity to Sensitive Urban Zones 
 
While not all 752 sensitive urban zones had arrests/raid events, most recorded events 
occurred in or within a mile of communes with sensitive urban zones.24  Initial research 
identified 512 communes containing at least one ZUS.25 
 
                                                
24The average area of a commune is approximately 5 square miles. 
 
25 Number is approximate due to differing definitions of what area is a commune. 
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Figure 16. Map Showing ZUS Regions and Event Locations. 
 
A ZUS is an official designation for what French authorities deem an “at risk” area. 
According to INSEE, France’s National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, 
Sensitive Urban Zones are “Les zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS) sont des territoires 
infra-urbains définis par les pouvoirs publics pour être la cible prioritaire de la politique 
de la ville, en fonction des considérations locales liées aux difficulties que connaissent 
les habitants de ces territoires.” “Sensitive Urban Zones (ZUS) are sub-urban areas 
defined by the government to be the primary target of the policy of the city, according to 
local analyses of the problems known to inhabitants of these territories.” ZUS are 
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characterized by high unemployment and low high school graduation rates. There are 
752 ZUSs in France, 718 of which are on the mainland in metropolitan France. There 
are 36,552 communes in metropolitan France, and 490 of these communes contain at 
least one ZUS. (Leonard, 2015) (Henry & Dieusaert, 2014)  
 
In 1996, the French government created the Sensitive Urban Zones as part of their 
Urban Regeneration Pact.  The Pact sought to bring public services to urban 
communities, ensure the security of residents, stimulate the local economy to increase 
employment opportunities, and promote social diversity. The government established an 
Economic Revitalization Fund to financially support this program.  It initially designated 
700 ZUS and added other zone types—350 Urban Regeneration Zones (ZRU) and 38 
Urban Free Zones (ZFU). 
 
The Urban Regeneration Pact increased police presence, and special educational 
facilities were established to accommodate juvenile repeat offenders. 
 
In 2003, the French government augmented ZUS funding when it established an Urban 
Renewal Programme for ZUS. This program had a five-year, €30 billion budget 
earmarked for the most blighted neighborhoods, and would be applied to physical 
improvements and attracting businesses to the areas. The program lures businesses to 
these areas with special incentives, such as waiving social security contribution 
requirements. A portion of the budget goes to special skills training for residents in need 
of education to make them more employable. (Government of France, 2007) 
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Communes that contain at least one ZUS: 
 
10 of the 50 events could not be identified at the commune level. For the 38 events that 
were pinpointed to a commune, 36 of those occurred in communes that contained at 
least one ZUS or were themselves a ZUS. The actual percentage may be as high as 
94%, given that 9 of the arrests/raid locations could not be located with more specificity 
than the general locale of Paris, and one (a multi-arrest/raid in Herault) could not be 
identified at the commune level.  If this is the case, then the presence of a sensitive 
urban zone is a strong predictor of safe-house location.26 
 
The correlation between the number of proximate ZUS and event locations increased 
when ethnic population was incorporated into the linear regression analysis.  Linear 
regression conducted on ZUS against arrests/raids showed a Pearson’s correlation of 
.777. 
 
If the number of proximate ZUS was considered with the percentage population of ethnic 
origin (Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Turks) per department, the Pearson correlation 
index increased to .8, indicating a high degree of correlation between these variables 
and the number of arrests/raids. Therefore, preliminary analysis indicates that ethnic 
composition does not significantly increase correlation, but the proximity to a ZUS is a 
key indicator of an area’s risk. 
 
                                                
26 The news articles that report of arrests/raids in Paris do not specify the arrondissement in 
which the arrest/raid events occurred. To include the events and analyze commune-level data, 
Paris is treated as a single commune for the purposes of this analysis. 
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ZUS Components 
 
Given that the presence of ZUS is correlated so highly with arrest/raid locations, the 
question logically follows, “what is it about a ZUS that makes it correlate so highly with 
the occurrence of arrest/raids?” Since the French government uses high unemployment, 
high crime, and low educational attainment as the main criteria determining designation, 
it makes sense to begin by examining these phenomena individually for any correlation 
with arrests/raid events. 
 
Unemployment 
 
According to Exploratory OLS and GWR applied to the France test case, unemployment 
is a very weak predictor of events, scoring at 3.12% significance in the exploratory 
model, just above the weakest predictor tested, the percentage of residents between 15 
and 64 years of age with no education beyond primary school.  This assessment 
appears to counter a body of social science analysis that argues otherwise. An IRIN 
News analysis cites unemployment as one of three significant radicalization factors in 
Kenya: “Unemployment, poverty and political marginalization are contributing to the 
Islamic radicalization of Kenya's youth, …” (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 
2013)  There are a number of potential explanations for its lack of predictive power in this 
model. High unemployment might be an influential factor in Kenya, but not in European 
countries, or it might only be impactful only if accompanied by other risk factors. 
Aggravating factors might be a high unemployment rate combined with high youth 
percentage in population. High GINI index might be another. The regression analysis 
conducted in this research, however, does not indicate that either factor combined with 
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unemployment constitutes a combination that encourages radicalization or an 
environment vulnerable to the establishment of extremist safe-houses—at least in the 
case of France. 
 
Secondly, the unemployment variable might only exert an impact if the unemployment 
rate is very high. The point at which unemployment becomes an aggravating factor is a 
separate empirical research topic in itself.  
 
 
Figure 17. Average Unemployment by Department, 2008 INSEE data. 
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Low Educational Level 
 
The correlation between radicalization and limited education has largely been dispelled 
by recent research. The assumption that low education is linked to radicalization persists 
in professional circles, despite over 30 years of counter-evidence.  Russell and Miller 
conducted research in 1977 to develop a sociological profile for terrorists. Based on 
statistics for over 350 terrorists in America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, they built 
a composite profile of a typical terrorist as a single male in his early to mid-20’s with a 
university education.  Interestingly, most of the terrorists in the study were recruited 
while pursuing their university education. A notable difference between Russell and 
Miller’s discoveries and that of more recent research is that the majority of extremists in 
the 1977 study had academic backgrounds in the humanities, law, and medicine, 
whereas a study conducted in 2009 indicates a majority pursued careers in physical 
sciences, such as engineering. Russell and Miller detected this shift and recommended 
further research to refine the profile to reflect “…increased involvement by technically 
trained individuals,…” (Russell & Miller, 1977) Gambetta and Hertog’s 2005 study found 
that university graduates with physical science backgrounds were “…strongly 
overrepresented…” in Islamic extremist groups. Gambetta and Hertog compiled 
educational data from 404 perpetrators of politically-motivated violent acts in 30 
countries between 2005 and 2007. Of the 178 perpetrators whose academic 
backgrounds could be determined, 44% had majored in engineering. Further, no other 
academic specialization followed closely behind the engineer majority. The second-
largest group consisted of Islamic Studies majors, who comprised 19% of the sample 
set. Gambetta and Hertog do not offer an explanation for this high proportionate 
representation beyond their observation that engineers tend to hold more conservative 
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views. Even if this observation is accurate, it does not adequately explain the tendency 
toward radicalization, as extremism can be interpreted as either highly conservative or 
highly rebellious behavior, depending on context or perspective. However, during an 
interview by IEEE Spectrum magazine, Hertog observed that “Engineering seems to 
attract a larger share of people drawn to rule-bound systems, compared with other 
scientists who primarily work on open-ended questions and might be more skeptical.” 
(Hertog, 2008) In fact, empirical research indicates the opposite might be true. As 
Berrebi concludes from his study, “If anything, the correlation I find is that those with 
higher education and higher living standards are more likely to participate in terrorist 
activity.” (Berrebi, 2007)  As explained earlier, Hassan’s (2001) study of 250 Palestinian 
extremists revealed that none were uneducated. 
 
The variable expressing limited or absence of formal education was included to 
investigate whether or not France exhibits outlier behavior. In short, it comports with the 
contemporary analysis in that events occurred in locations and involved individuals with 
limited as well as high education. 
 
Exploratory regression analysis that included this variable found the low education 
coefficient statistically significant for only 27% of the datapoints. Its influence was evenly 
split, with 55.21% of the arrondissements exhibiting a positive correlation between 
limited education and events, and 44.79% of the arrondissements showing a negative 
correlation.  
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Figure 18. Population Percentage Aged 18-64 with No Education Beyond High School by 
Department, 2008 INSEE  data. 
 
State Policy 
 
For the purposes of this research, state policy was an initial candidate variable because 
states can implement policies that affect a location’s suitability for harboring violent 
extremists, either intentionally or unintentionally.  For example, they may do so 
intentionally through the use terrorist entities as foreign policy tools, perhaps providing 
training and boarding locations to the groups that advance the host state’s interest.  
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States can also be unintentional sponsors if they are controlled by a weak central 
government, or if they tolerate—or cannot control—government corruption at the local 
level and radicalized elements take advantage of that vulnerability. 
 
Some states—Syria and Iran, for example—have been accused of using terrorist groups 
to achieve foreign policy ends.  Before the 2011 conflict in Syria, members of the 
international community asserted that Syria sought to further its interests in Lebanon by 
directly supporting Hamas and by working with Hizballah.  Hizballah, in turn, has been 
linked to Iran, with whom it shares a friendly relationship and religious ideology.  Such 
ties could extend to offering those groups safe harbor and training. Such was the case of 
Pakistan’s early assistance to the Taliban, which is now threatening its stability both 
directly and by complicating many of its diplomatic initiatives.  Intentional state sponsors 
are safe-houses on the macro-level, and groups that have the support of governments 
can strike far beyond neighboring states and be truly global, with considerable resources 
from which to draw. 
 
Unintentionally hospitable state policy can have significant impact as a variable 
coefficient simply because terrorists are more likely to establish bases in regions within 
which it is easiest to operate.  This phenomenon accounts for much of the resiliency of 
terrorism.  It expresses on a macro-level what law enforcement faces on a micro-level 
whenever they attempt to eliminate drug-dealing and prostitution from an afflicted 
neighborhood—the crime is not eliminated, as offenders simply move to a more 
hospitable region and continue their activities.  
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State Policy—Identity Conflict Dynamic 
 
This political environment can exist in countries containing multicultural regions that are 
often near a border, where residents may identify with the neighboring state rather than 
the state in which they reside, thus compromising the allegiance of local officials who are 
often residents of that enclave, as well.  The importance of social identity over national 
identity can diminish the respect of legal boundaries, rendering certain illegal activities 
socially and morally acceptable. Some Muslim enclaves in France emphasize their 
social identity over that of their French citizenship. Radicalized French natives identify 
with those social groups whose extremist doctrine they adopt.  Thus, they not only 
identify with that social group, but with the larger culture or nation from which it 
originated. 
 
In some instances, social identity not only isolates the group from the larger community, 
but also shapes its attitude toward the government.  Local residents do not view the host 
country as their supporter or protector, and they often view the state as “other”, rather 
than as a macro-expression of their local society.  This attitude can be found in many 
Muslim communities in France. These residents do not identify with native French 
citizens and by extension, the French government. They believe they are viewed as 
outsiders, and that the government holds the interests of the native French over their 
own. Their perception is reinforced by domestic policies that restrict Muslims, but have 
no similar effect on other groups. Thus, their attitude of “otherness” toward the state 
moves beyond characterization as merely foreign and becomes adversarial.   
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The central government’s influence is further weakened if the region is also 
geographically remote. This is often the case in regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in 
Syria before its current internal conflict. This dynamic does not apply to France, but it is 
an important variable to consider when applying the model to other cases.   
 
A state’s political environment shapes many other variables, generating domestic and 
foreign policies that affect its cultural environments and its physical security (e.g., 
enabling or inhibiting smuggling routes). For example, France’s refusal to participate in 
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and its active support of Palestinian statehood 
demonstrate that it is not generally hostile to Muslim views, or even to some positions 
championed by religious extremists.  Neither is it an autocratic state that violently 
crushes all dissent.  However, French perspectives on identity create difficulties in 
reconciling one’s identity as French for those whose cultural and religious identities 
originate from a region beyond French borders. Ascertaining the relative importance of 
these two factors—the weighting of variables in multi-modal modeling systems—is 
critical to the determination of a tipping point with respect to influence of identity on a 
location’s vulnerability to hosting extremist safehavens.  Successful factor weighting can 
also determine whether or not changes in public policy or foreign policy can sufficiently 
alter the weighting and improve the security situation. 
 
State Policy—The Headscarf Ban 
 
State policy could be a contributing factor because some policies impact daily life and 
can even send an official message about what the state values in terms of the social 
identity of its residents.  France’s 2005 prohibition of head scarves in public schools is 
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one such example. The ban implemented Laïcité—the French policy of secularism. The 
government argued that wearing a headscarf in school amounted to displaying a 
religious symbol in a public setting. Most French citizens supported the headscarf ban, 
and Muslims might interpret this widespread support of an official prohibition of a 
religious practice as a rejection of their religious identity.  The message in effect being, 
“you aren’t part of the larger ‘we’, and we don’t want to see you in our public spaces”.  
However, Laïcité as a state policy might not be a risk factor. More likely, the actual risk 
factor is the popular attitude that supports the policy. In 2004, Comprendre Pour Mieux 
Décider (CSA) conducted a survey to gauge the level of support for the ban before it 
was implemented and found that 49% of Muslim women supported the ban. A significant 
proportion (43%) opposed it, but this split suggests that if the headscarf ban was 
intended as a societal message, it was not a clear one. (Evry, 2004) 
 
Supportive Population 
 
A supportive population is necessary for the group’s sustained functioning as a macro-
safe-house.  The ethnic population also provides some of the group’s funding and is 
usually the primary recruitment base. Thus, the group’s ability to identify with the ethnic 
population is a prerequisite for its continued operation.  Successful identification does 
not rest solely on shared culture. Agreement with terrorists’ grievances must be shared 
by the ethnic community, and that community must believe that terrorist group advances 
their shared interests. 
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The expression of this contributing factor becomes more complicated with the existence 
of multiple groups whose interests overlap and who both claim the same cultural identity.  
Although it is possible for more than one terrorist group to enjoy the support of an ethnic 
community, resources are a valuable benefit of securing popular support.  Money and 
recruits are finite resources, and competition between terrorist groups often occurs.  The 
groups compete for the community’s devotion by engaging in activities designed to 
demonstrate their dedication to the shared cause and their value to the community.  
Dedication is sometimes demonstrated through launching operations designed to draw 
attention on the world stage.  However, such endeavors require some care, as it is 
possible to overstep the bounds of what is acceptable to the population. Value to the 
community is expressed by providing services that the population appreciates.  Hamas 
and Hizballah have conducted many terrorist acts, but also expend resources within their 
ethnic communities to provide social services in order to demonstrate their value as 
community benefactors (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). 
 
Religiosity Coefficients 
 
This research seeks insight into the locations that radicalized individuals consider 
suitable to establish residence, recruit, store supplies, and plan attacks. The individuals 
associated with the test data claimed religious motivation based on radical 
misinterpretation of Islamic teachings. While variables quantifying supportive populations 
(detailed in the previous section, “Supportive Population”) sometimes touch on religion, 
another variable was designed to quantify radicalized religiosity. This “radical religiosity” 
variable—RR coefficient was designed as a compound variable that incorporated the 
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concentration of mosques with the mosques’ interpretations of Islam. The process 
involved researching religious leaders who espoused intolerant, extremist, and finally, 
explicitly violent interpretations of Islamic concepts. Once identified, further research was 
conducted to identify the mosques they led and where they were welcomed as guest 
clerics. Another variable for “inclusive religiosity”—IR coefficient—was developed for 
locations with mosques led by clerics who espoused an unusually inclusive interpretation 
of Islam. For example, Mohammed Ludovic Lütfi Zahed encourages tolerance of 
homosexuality, a behavior that is generally rejected by Muslims. (Würger, 2014) The IR 
variable could be negative or positive coefficient. It might lessen the attractiveness of a 
site if a radicalized individual perceived the area as an unlikely area for successful 
recruiting, or as an area where the risk of being exposed to counter-terrorism authorities 
was high. Conversely, it might function as a positive coefficient if the Imam were in the 
minority, and the surrounding population was deeply offended by the unusually liberal 
interpretation of Islam.  
 
To build the shape file for this variable, a dataset consisting of the names of Mosques, 
their geographic coordinates, addresses, and associated leaders was developed from 
extensive internet research of newspaper articles, blogs, interviews, and academic 
papers that addressed Islamic practices in France. The variables were judged 
inapplicable to France for several reasons.  Firstly, quantifying the mosques was 
daunting based on sheer volume. As of 2009, there were over 2,000 mosques in 
mainland France. (Marcel, 2009) It is difficult to obtain an exact number, largely because 
the fundamental question of what constitutes a mosque is difficult to answer. This 
question could not be answered satisfactorily given the data available, even when a 
clear definition is established. While conducting research for each mosque included in 
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the dataset, it was discovered that some entities listed as mosques were little more than 
small prayer rooms. The question arises, “isn’t that a mosque, as well?”  One could 
define a mosque as a place of prayer guided by an individual acknowledged in religious 
circles as qualified to lead prayers.  If so, then many of these prayer rooms are 
mosques. The legitimacy of these sites as mosques could not be established if the 
identities and credentials of their imams were not explicitly available, and this was often 
the case. Even many of the larger mosques did not list the identities of their religious 
directors. Additionally, even if this data were available, its inclusion might introduce a 
temporal component in the analysis. The imam’s tenure at the mosque would have to be 
temporally established and bracketed as a variable, and the residency period of the 
sample set subjects would have to be established and incorporated, as well. Temporal 
analysis would be a welcome addition if the sample size were large enough to 
incorporate temporal analysis into the regression model. Since there were only 49 
events from 2008-2012, enlarging the sample would require either expanding the time 
window, or engaging French counter-terrorism and law enforcement authorities to 
enhance the sample set granularity. 
 
Existing Smuggling Routes 
 
Transportation routes for the support of terrorist activities are often established along 
pre-existing routes used for other illegal activities, such as drug-smuggling, and terrorist 
operations are frequently funded through illicit trade. For instance, France is a major 
transit and distribution point for Moroccan cannabis, thus there is a pre-established 
network for transportation related to terrorist activity. (Caron, 2015) (Boekhout van 
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Solinge, 1995)  Therefore, it is not surprising that convicted terrorist Menad Benchellali 
had a brother Hafed who was convicted of a financial crime—payroll theft.   Their 
father’s connection with the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) has provided a much 
needed avenue through which to obtain financing.  The group used its ties to extremist 
enclaves in France (and elsewhere in Europe) to engage in drug and weapons 
trafficking. Thus, not only does existing illicit trade increase the probability of the 
development of terrorist safe-houses, but the presence of these locations increases the 
local crime rate, as the town of Roubaix experienced when its residents fell victim to 
several armed robberies.  
 
A 2005 report by Shelley, et al. (2005) entitled Methods and Motives: Exploring Links 
Between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism, studied links 
between criminal networks and terrorist groups and identified 12 situations, or watch 
points, in which this interaction was likely to occur.  Such instances result in the 
enhancement of both criminal and terrorist entities. The coincidental needs of both 
sectors (i.e., safe-houses, smuggling routes, untraceable funds) highlight similarities 
between the two groups, thus some contributing factors are held in common.  These 
factors closely resemble the watch points described in the report.  
 
Although the research of Shelley et al. primarily focused on criminal organizations, the 
ability of these groups to enhance terrorist operations warrants that the significance of 
social environment to criminal networks be briefly addressed.  Criminal networks often 
identify with their parent culture and use this affinity to deeply entrench themselves 
within their ethnic neighborhoods, and they do so on several levels. Firstly, they apply 
their intimate knowledge of the social mores, customs, and language of the culture to 
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garner sympathy from their community.  Secondly, they capitalize on the insular 
behavior of an ethnic community that is disenfranchised from the mainstream population. 
The community either supports them as “one of their own”, or fails to report their crimes 
out of mistrust of authorities and a lack of confidence in its ability to protect them in what 
is, in some ways, a state within a state.  
 
Border Proximity 
 
Geographical proximity to inter-state borders and transportation routes increases the 
vulnerability of the locale.  These locations allow actors to establish stable bases without 
sacrificing the mobility required to commit inter-state acts or seek refuge if threatened by 
local authorities.  Proximity to borders and transport routes (both inter-state and local) 
facilitates the movement of illicit goods, such as weapons or drugs.   
 
Venissieux, France is an example of a city offering a supportive environment near a 
state border, providing easy access to major highways and less than two hours from 
Switzerland. Local residents of this Lyon suburb identified more closely with radicalized 
individuals in their midst and actively supported them by falsely reporting their passports 
as “lost” so that a local extremist cell could use them for interstate travel.  Venissieux 
residents Mourad and Nizar Sassi used the documents to enter Afghanistan to attend an 
Al-Q’aeda training camp, where they were captured while combating U.S. forces. 
(Associated Press, 2004) 
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Roubaix is another example of a French locale with a supportive population that is 
proximate to an interstate border. It is just over an hour from Brussels. In 2005, Roubaix 
resident Lionel Dumont was sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role leading an 
Islamic extremist cell that financed jihadist attacks via armed robberies. (Mili, 2006) 
 
Border proximity was not included in the exploratory regression analysis because 
France’s extensive road network, easy access to airports and sea ports render inter-
state travel convenient for virtually every French locale. It is however, worthy of note that 
14 of the 50, or almost a third of the events in the dataset are positioned within eight 
miles of an inter-state border or sea coast. This might seem like an unimpressive 
proportion, but it implies that geographic proximity to a border could have impact in other 
case studies.  
 
Micro-level Variables 
 
One of the most frustrating aspects of using quantitative analytic techniques is that the 
analysis is often limited by the availability and format of the data required for the 
analysis. Micro-level variables were omitted from the exploratory regression analysis 
because the data granularity simply was not available in this research context. While the 
demographic and municipal data exist at the required granularity, the test data are not 
openly available to this level of specificity. Thus, while the GIS files can be constructed—
no easy feat, but not impossible—the test data could rarely be resolved to the specific 
address. Since there are only 50 datapoints in the test dataset, nearly all of them would 
have to have building level location data as a prerequisite to including micro-level 
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variables in the model. Greater refinement of the test data could result in a more 
nuanced model that incorporates these variables. 
 
While the previously described factors can influence neighborhoods at more local 
scales, additional factors can manifest on the micro-scale that impact the selection of the 
base or safe-house itself, once a local neighborhood is identified. 
 
Desirable structures exhibit several characteristics.  The ideal site is surrounded by 
space sufficient for maneuverability while hidden from view.  For instance, the presence 
of buildings with high surrounding walls, trees or other objects that obstruct aerial view, 
enable the transport of contraband and operatives while unseen.  This area provides a 
protected space for the alteration of vehicles for purposes such as obscuring the 
vehicle’s identity from law enforcement or the installation of weapons.  
 
Extensions of the geographical aspect of this factor include the presence of hidden 
driveways. Angles or structures that enable one-way surveillance, such that the group 
can be aware of others approaching without themselves being seen are also desirable 
characteristics of safe-houses.  Therefore, buildings that exhibit these features should be 
viewed with suspicion as buildings likely to serve as safe-houses. 
 
Access routes are another important consideration and their viability depends on 
geographical and social factors.  Proximity to routes that lead to borders facilitate either 
cross-border attacks to neighboring states hostile to terrorists or an escape to states out 
of reach from local law enforcement.  Major thoroughfares that lead to mass modes of 
transportation, such as airports and train stations, enable increased mobility, sometimes 
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with the possibility of anonymity, as some forms of mass transit, such as busses, trains, 
and busy streets, allow individuals to evade law enforcement and become “lost in the 
crowd”.   
 
Social factors that contribute to the desirability of access routes include supportive local 
populations, populations of diverse ethnicity, and high-crime areas. The importance of 
supportive populations is described in the section specifically addressing this factor, but 
it is important to note that although a supportive population exerts an influence at both 
macro- and micro-levels, its impact is usually felt most acutely at the micro-level.  The 
effectiveness of a supportive population stems from its “grass roots” power.  If the 
neighborhood sympathizes with the terrorist group or is at minimum, hostile to 
government officials, they will be aware of the movements of the individuals, but allow 
them to continue operating by refusing to provide information leading to the group’s 
apprehension. In extreme cases, such support effectively extends the safe operating 
space if the terrorists can be seen on the streets with little or no security risk to 
themselves.   
 
As is often the case for research involving the social sciences, efforts to establish 
precise and discrete objects of study prove challenging.  More importantly, when 
achieved, such divisions distort results, as they omit qualities that can only be observed 
if the social mechanisms are viewed holistically.  The interdependence among many, if 
not all, of the contributing factors is readily apparent.  Yet, their ability to vary as 
separately identifiable elements is also clear.  The ability to perceive the subtle 
relationships and the changes that their variations exert on the whole is critical to 
producing a meaningful model with practical applications. 
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VIII.  Conclusion 
 
This dissertation research demonstrates that if spatial components are omitted, the 
independent variables have a weak to insignificant correlation with the presence of safe-
houses and often, multicollinearity is present when multiple variables are considered in 
combination. However, the incorporation of geographic weighting reveals linkages 
between independent variables and the presence of safe-houses because 
geographically weighted regression integrates spatial characteristics that affect social 
phenomena. A cornerstone of GIS theory is Tobler’s First Law of Geography which 
states that, “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related 
than distant things”. Geographic regression analysis incorporates the social reality that 
those of similar social characteristics tend to cluster together, and as the distance 
increases from a point of comparison, those similarities tend to diminish. An analytic 
technique that can account for this phenomenon has greater analytical power than a 
technique that only graphs quantifiable relationships when applied to social topics. 
 
The factors presented for this model are widely recognized by specialists in security 
studies as playing an influential role in terrorist activity.  Though this research has 
provided insight concerning these factors, debate on their relative importance, degree of 
interaction and interdependence is expected to continue, as it should, especially 
considering the data challenges associated with this case study. Future efforts building 
upon this research can refine the model design and apply it to more extensive datasets 
to provide a deeper understanding of these issues, and this information can be useful to 
counteract radicalization and identify potential locations for safehavens.   
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Furthermore, the model’s GIS environment facilitates comprehension of the results by 
providing a visual depiction of the output, potentially presenting the user with multiple 
levels of analysis within a single graphic. Thus, it can convey results in a manner 
unmatched by a strictly textual format. This feature is particularly useful when conveying 
analysis to those lacking a background in quantitative analysis. 
 
This prototype model can serve as the foundation to develop a model that not only 
informs security specialists on a practical level, but also offers theoretical and policy-
focused benefits.  Geographically weighted regression is flexible and scalable in that it 
can incorporate multiple variables and process large datasets, producing a customized 
design for the region to which it is applied.  
 
With the integration of additional relevant datasets of sufficient granularity, the model 
could provide indicators of at-risk areas. If test data with high demographic granularity is 
included, micro-level variables excluded from this prototype (described in chapter ”Micro-
level Variables”) could be evaluated to characterize their impact. For example, specific 
addresses of those arrested and of raid locations could test neighborhood and building 
characteristics with the inclusion of datasets with similar specificity. INSEE stores this 
type of data.27 Government agencies and non-profit organizations often have specialized 
databases that could be incorporated in the model to evaluate other variables.  
 
                                                
27 An example of this type of high granularity dataset is base-ic-logement-2011.xls. This file 
contains the number of rooms and type of residence, how many reserved parking spaces, type of 
heating, the year it was built, how long residences were occupied before the residents moved, 
and other variables, all on the arrondissement level. 
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Refinements to this model can assist policy-makers and social scientists, providing 
insights into whether state policy on the local level is more influential than at the national 
level, or whether those policies can provide an effective counterbalance to other factors, 
such as immigration waves, demand fluctuation of employment skillsets, and under what 
conditions those policies would have the most impact. 
 
For example, in 2008, France’s Ministry for Higher Education and Research launched 
Operation Campus to improve France’s international standing in the higher education 
and scientific research arenas. The plan allocated €5 billion to selected universities, 
enabling the establishment of 10 “super-campuses” for higher education and research.  
University recipients were chosen on the basis of “…their pedagogical and scientific 
ambition, building renovation needs, proposals for improving student life and the extent 
to which their region would benefit from their ‘structural and innovative character’”. 
(Marshall, 2008) A portion of the funding established “super-campuses” in Lyon and 
Toulouse, areas that showed positive correlation of higher education with terrorism-
associated raids or arrests in the prototype model.28 Higher education showed no 
significant correlation in Strasbourg, also a super-campus recipient. If a refined version 
of the model with higher data granularity showed similar results, the funding might be 
more effectively allocated to a region where higher education was a negatively-
correlated coefficient.  
                                                
28 To prevent misinterpretation of this paragraph, I re-iterate that the model developed in this 
research is a prototype. This paragraph does not imply that 1) there is a definite correlation 
between higher education and the existence of a location that hosts extremists, or 2) that French 
policy-makers should have made different policy decisions. First, the model-due to limitations 
mentioned in the body of this text-does not include datasets of sufficient granularity and scope to 
assess with strong confidence that the three coefficients identified in the model are in fact, the 
three most significant variables, nor that the nature of their correlation-negative or positive-is 
reflective of reality. 
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The geographically-weighted regression included in ESRI software is based on ordinary 
least squares statistical method. As the research developed, datasets that would be the 
basis for coefficients grew very large, especially in relation to the test data (events). The 
problem of the small sample set was compounded by granularity issues that became 
more pronounced as the research progressed. These problems were highlighted through 
extensive testing using different types of regression models (including logistical 
regression), While GWR provided insight into the research question, its use of ordinary 
least squares to generate the weights proved to be a less than ideal fit.  
 
However, other regression techniques can be applied in future research to yield more 
accurate results if these techniques can be integrated with geographic weighting. For 
example, the application of regularized regression techniques would address problems 
associated with overfitting, a vulnerability associated with this dissertation research, 
given the volume and complexity of the independent variable set relative to the sample 
size.  
 
Lasso regularization constrains the residual sum of squares to the parameter vectors’ L1 
norm to a maximum value. The L1 norm minimizes the sum of the absolute differences 
between the observed and estimated values.  Robert Tibshirani developed this 
regularization technique and uses a Newton-Raphson algorithm to perform an iterative 
reweighting least squares loop to determine the maximum value. (Tibshirani, 1996) 
 
The Newton-Raphson algorithm employs a function based on the maximum value from a 
Taylor series approximation. The Taylor series approximates the function that is the 
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closest fit to the test data’s behavior against a set of parameters. The resulting maximum 
constant is used to specify the algorithm for first-order optimization.  
 
For the Lasso algorithm, if x is the independent variable and y is the dependent variable, 
the lasso estimate (𝛼𝛼’, 𝛽𝛽’) is  
 
 = arg min �∑ �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 −  𝛼𝛼 −  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 �  subject to ∑ |𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖| ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 .29 
where β is the parameter coefficient. The sum of the absolute values of the parameter 
coefficient are constrained by the tuning parameter t—known as the penalty. When t = 0, 
parameter coefficient β is the linear regression estimate, and as t increases, it shrinks 
the parameter coefficient. Lasso regularization sets to zero the parameters that do not 
impact the dependent variable Thus, lasso regularization performs variable selection as 
it “throws out” irrelevant variables.  
 
Wheeler (2009) tested the effectiveness of the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection 
Operator (LASSO) applied to geographically weighted regression to manage 
multicollinearity in coefficients against non-regularized GWR and ridge-regularized 
GWR. He detected multicollinearity in median income and housing rates when applying 
non-regularized GWR to a Columbus, Ohio crime dataset. Wheeler found that the GWR 
model with localized LASSO outperformed GWR when applied to the crime dataset. 
However, he also found that the localized LASSO overshrinks regression coefficients 
                                                
29 (Tibshirani, 1996) 
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and therefore, recommends it only be used to predict the response variable. In this 
research context, LASSO would be applied to the regression coefficients, necessitating 
the application of global, rather than local LASSO. However, while globalized LASSO 
was shown to be more accurate, it is not a viable method for large datasets, as 
computational demands could exceed computer memory capacity. This dissertation 
research involved a library of large datasets, and thus would not have been viable had 
global LASSO been utilized. 
 
Elastic net regularization was developed by Zou and Hastie (2005) to address limitations 
of the Lasso regularization technique. Lasso saturates when accommodating a high 
number of predictor variables. It also eliminates multicollinearity by eliminating all but 
one of the collinear variables. Zou and Hastie demonstrate the effectiveness of their 
method using a genetic research case study, where the sample size is small (less than 
100) with respect to the variable array (thousands of genes). Gene correlations are often 
present, as many share the same biological pathway. Elastic net will select variable 
clusters if one variable in that cluster is deemed relevant. The research data in this 
dissertation included many variables that would behave as clusters. For instance, crime 
statistics were available for burglaries, car thefts, and robberies. These crime statistics 
increased and decreased together over time and space. Lasso would eliminate all but 
one of the variables, and OLS would require the researcher to omit two of the three 
variables to eliminate the multicollinearity. This requirement implies that the inclusion of 
all three variables would contribute nothing to the model, but this might not be the case. 
It’s possible that nuances in behavior could be lost. Elastic net regularization allows the 
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incorporation of collinear variables, grouping the coefficients into an elastic net 
framework. 
 
Elastic net is a hybridization of L1 and L2 norms. Whereas for ordinary least squares, 
the regularization parameter alpha is zero and for Lasso alpha is equal to one, alpha 
values for elastic net lie between zero and one. This regularization technique could be 
the preferred alternative if ordinary least squares is too rigid and lasso is judged as too 
relaxed for the problem set. 
 
Related research has generally been focused on identifying risks so that potential 
targets can be protected. It is hoped that this model will improve security through 
prevention, not only by providing insights into drivers and mitigating factors to better 
identify solutions, but also by helping to identify which questions should be asked to 
implement a solution more effectively.  
 
For instance, the model developed in this research can direct stakeholders’ attention to 
areas that might require changes in policy implementation, resource allocation—and 
depending on the behavior and level of coefficient impact—provide insight into what 
changes might be most effective to minimize an area’s vulnerability to security threats 
associated with radicalization. For example, if municipal representation manifests as a 
negatively correlated coefficient in some regions but shows little correlation in others, 
resources aimed at encouraging group members to enter politics could be concentrated 
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in those regions most affected by that coefficient. Moreover, this targeted approach can 
be fiscally prudent because resources would not be expended where they are unlikely to 
yield significant dividends.  
 
Furthermore, this model can reveal key questions that might otherwise not be asked. For 
example, starkly contrasting coefficient behavior in different regions might reveal an 
unusual dynamic, and variables can have mutual effects that vary as conditions change. 
These contrasting behaviors are evident in the model results, but often this type of 
dynamic is active for years and goes unnoticed or is only vaguely apparent outside the 
context of the model. There are many possible explanations for contrasting coefficient 
behavior.  One possibility could be the impact of additional variables that are present in 
some of the regions, yet are absent or play a muted role in other areas.  
 
Another possibility might rest with the driver sustaining the variable. For instance, 
consider the hypothetical case of country whose high-income coefficients exact 
contrasting effects in different districts. One of the high-income districts might owe its 
financial health to a resident population that resides outside the country, but these 
seasonal residents purchase property because they spend much of their time in the 
district and have the wealth to do so. These part-time residents affect the demographic, 
but they might have little effect on local industries, commerce, and have limited 
interaction with natives. The impact of these high-income residents could be quite 
different from that of residents of another district who gained their wealth through local 
entrepreneurial endeavors or through professional training. This group might raise their 
children in the area, and might perhaps identify more closely with and have a deeper 
commitment to the area in which they reside. The model output of this particular case 
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might reveal that an emotional stake in the area, or the attitude of permanency that often 
accompanies those who “lay down stakes” to raise families, reveals itself as an 
unusually strong variable that is the true coefficient—not high-income. Thus, in this 
example, the model enabled analysis that cast aside a less relevant question, “what is 
the effect of high-income on a district’s vulnerability to harboring a safe-house in country 
X?”, and shed light on the question that should actually be asked, which is “how can we 
deepen commitment to a space and associate that commitment with identity?” I offer this 
exposition as a hypothetical example to illustrate how the model can facilitate the 
development of questions that might be more effective catalysts for identifying solutions 
for at-risk areas.  Finally, this research has laid the foundation for future refinements and 
applications of this approach. Thus, it is hoped that going forward this work will deepen 
our understanding of multivariate interdependencies and how these differ among 
countries in the course of further refinements and applications of this model. This 
research should, on a practical level, focus attention on vulnerable areas before that 
area becomes destabilized, and serve as a guide to facilitate resource allocation that 
enhances quality-of-life for communities. 
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Note on Map classification of variables and GWR coefficients. 
With the exception of maps displaying Local R2 values, classes are divided using the 
Natural Jenks Optimization Method. This classification technique was developed by 
George Frederick Jenks and is often used to display data on maps. This method finds 
natural breaks in the data by comparing the sum of the squared means deviations to 
define the classes such that the average deviation from the class mean is minimized, but 
the deviation between the classes is maximized. (Brunsdon, Fotheringham, & Charlton, 
1998) 
 
 
 
This does not constitute an official release of United States Government (USG) 
information.  All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of 
the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the USG. Nothing in 
the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government 
authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views. This material 
has been reviewed for classification and compliance with legal obligations. 
 
 
 
111 
 
Bibliography 
(2008). Retrieved from State Department Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm 
 
Adida, C., Laitin, D., & Valfort, M.-A. (2009). Integration into Europe: Identifying a Muslim 
Effect. For presentation at the December 11-12, 2009 meeting of the Working Group on 
African Political Economy. 
 
Adida, C., Laitin, D., & Valfort, M.-A. (2012). Muslims in France: Identifying a 
Discriminatory Equilibrium. Institute for the Study of Labor. 
 
Al Arabiya. (2012, November 21). Against all odds, ‘Mosque for gays’ to open in France. 
al Arabiya. 
 
Associated Press. (2004, January 19). French Town Notorious for Islamic Radicalism. 
Associated Press. 
 
Azam, J.-P. (2010). Why Suicide-Terrorists Get Educated and What to Do About It. 
Toulouse University, Toulouse School of Economics. 
 
BBC. (2010, October 19). France Roma Expulsions. BBC. 
 
Belmssous, H. (2002, November 14). Price to pay for ‘island of privilege’: fenced off in 
France. Le Monde diplomatique. 
 
Berrebi, C. (2007, December). Evidence About the Link Between Education Powverty 
and Terrorism Among Palestinians. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public 
Policy., 13(1), 1554-8597. 
 
Bhui, K. (2014). Is Violent Radicalisation Associated with Poverty, Migration, Poor Self-
Reported Health and CommonMental Disorders? (X. J. Yong-hui Dang, Ed.) 9(3). 
 
Boekhout van Solinge, T. (1995). Cannabis in France. Cannabis Policy, Criminal Law 
and Human Rights Conference. Germany: Bremen University. 
 
Brown, D., Dalton, J., & Hoyle, H. (2004). Spatial Forecast Methods for Terrorist Events 
in Urban Environments. Presentation at the Second Symposium on Intelligence and 
Security Informatics.  
 
Brunsdon, C., Fotheringham, S., & Charlton, M. (1998). Geographically weighted 
regression--modelling spatial non-stationarity. The Statistician, 47(3), 431-443. 
 
Camilleri, R. (2012). Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France. Background 
Report, Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 
 
Caron, P.-L. (2015, July 27). Police Seize Nearly Six Tons of Hashish in Major Drug Bust 
in France. Vice News. Retrieved from https://news.vice.com/article/police-seize-nearly-
six-tons-of-hashish-in-major-drug-bust-in-france 
112 
 
 
Chang, A. (n.d.). Table of Sample Size Requirement for Multiple Regresson. Retrieved 
from StatsToDo: http://www.statstodo.com/SSizMReg_Tab.php 
 
Chiriac, M. (2012, September 11). France, EU, Seek Action on Roma from Romania. 
Balkan Insight. 
 
Dutton, P. (2007, August 11). France’s Model Healthcare System. The Boston Globe. 
 
Evry. (2004, February 4). The war of the headscarves. The Economist. 
 
Fields, R. M., Elbedour, S., & Hein, A. (2002). The Palestinian suicide bomber. In C. ed. 
Stout, The Psychology of Terrorism: Clinical Aspects and Responses (pp. 193-223). 
Westport: Prager Publishers. 
 
Finney, N., & Simpson, L. (2006). Place of residence of Muslims charged with terrorism 
under UK legislation. NonTechnical Summary Report, The University of Manchester, 
Cathie Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Reasearch. 
 
Francica, J. (2007, September 5). Assigning Risk to Targets of Terrorism - A Location 
Intelligent Approach. Directions Magazine. 
 
Gennip, Y. v., Hunter, B., Ahn, R., Elliott, P., Luh, K., Halvorson, M., et al. (2012, 
November). Community detection using spectral clustering on sparse geosocial data. 
SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 73(1), 67-83. 
 
Government of France. (2007). Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. United Nations Economic and Social Council. 
New York: Government of France. 
 
Groff, E. R. (2008). Adding the Temporal and Spatial Aspects of Routine Activities: A 
Further Test of Routine Activity Theory. Security Journal(21), 95-116. 
 
Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hassan, N. (2001, November 19). An Arsinal of Believers. The New Yorker. 
 
Henry, M., & Dieusaert, P. (2014). Onzus Infos--L’emploi des femmes dans les zones 
urbaines sensibles. Observatoire National Des Zones Urbaines Sensibles. Département 
études statistiques et systèmes d’information du SG. 
 
Hertog, S. (2008, September 1). Extremist Engineers. (S. Karlin, Interviewer) IEEE 
Spectrum. 
 
Hinnant, L. (2012, October 12). 1 dead, 10 arrested in anti-terror sweep in France. 
Associated Press. 
 
Holman, T. (2015, January 15). The Clear Banner: French Foreign Fighters in Iraq 2003-
2008. Jihadology.net. 
113 
 
 
Integrated Regional Information Networks. (2013, May 9). Countering the radicalization 
of Kenya's youth. IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis. 
 
Ireland, D. (2005, November 06). WHY IS FRANCE BURNING? The rebellion of a lost 
generation. 
 
Jones, J. D., & Wiseman, R. J. (2006, September 8). Community Policing in Europe: 
Structure and Best Practices-Sweden, France, Germany. Retrieved 2015, from Los 
Angeles Community Policing. 
 
Knofczynski, G., & Mundfrom, D. (2008, June). Sample Sizes When Using Multiple  
Linear Regression for Prediction. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 68(3), 
431-442. 
 
Leonard, T. (2015, March). France Changing--What this Weeks Elections Mean for 
France and the World. Retrieved September 7, 2015, from Values & Capitalism: 
http://www.valuesandcapitalism.com/france-changing-what-this-weeks-elections-mean-
for-france-and-the-world/ 
 
Macy, M., & Miller, R. (2001). From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and 
Agent-Based Modeling. Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 143-166. 
 
Marcel, M. (2009). Constructing Mosques: The Governance of Islam in France and the 
Netherlands. Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR). 
 
Marshall, J. (2008, July 20). France: More Super-Campuses Announced. University 
World News (37). 
 
McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: 
Pathways Toward Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20, 415-433. 
 
Mili, H. (2006, January 12). Tangled Webs: Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups. 
Terrorism Monitor, 4(1). 
 
Niebuhr, R. (1960). Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York: Scribner. 
Open Source Center. (2009). Afghanistan-Geospatial Analysis Reveals Patterns in 
Terrorist Incidents 2004-2008. Washington, DC: Open Source Center. 
 
Parrish, K. (2012, March 28). Link Grows Between Terrorism, Organized Crime, Officials 
Say. Retrieved 2015, from Defense.gov: 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67721 
 
Peterson, F., & Fray, P. (2004, January 16). Brigette Denies Terrorist Links in Letter. 
Sydney Morning Herald. 
 
Phelan, J. (2012, December 4). Police Shooting: Police Arrest 2 Suspected 
Accomplices. Global Post. 
 
114 
 
Pizzi, M. (2014, March 19). Study finds unexpected risk factors for violent radicalization. 
al-Jazeera America. 
 
Richardson, C. (2011). Relative Deprivation Theory in Terrorism: A Study of Higher 
Education and Unemployment as Predictors of Terrorism. New York: New York 
University Politics Department. 
 
Russell, C. A., & Miller, B. H. (1977). Profie of a Terrorist. Terrorism, 1(1). 
 
Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Shafiq, M. N., & Sinno, A. H. (2009, August). Education Income and SUpport for Suicide 
Bombings-Evidence from Six Muslim Countries. 
 
Shelley, L., Picareli, J. T., Irby, A., Hart, D. M., Craig-Hart, P. A., Williams, P., et al. 
(2005, June 23). Methods and motives: exploring links between transnational organized 
crime & international terrorism. National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
Shi, H., Zhang, L., & Liu, J. (2005). Incorporating Geographic Space and Attribute Space 
into the Kernel Weighting Function of Geographically Weighted Regression. 8th 
International Conference on GeoComputation. Ann Arbor: Geocomputation Conference. 
Shi, H., Zhang, L., & Liu, J. (2006, April). A new spatial-attribute weighting function for 
geographically weighted regression. Canadian Journal of Forest Research. 
 
Simon, P. (2012). French national identity and integration: who belongs to the national 
community? Transatlantic Council on Migration. Washington, DC: Migration Policy 
Institute. 
 
Simon, P., Beauchemin, C., & Hamelle, C. (2010). Trajectories and Origins: Survey on 
Population Diversity in France. Retrieved from Institut National d'Études 
Démographiques (INED): http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idg:wpaper:168.1 
 
Smith, B. L., Damphousse, K. R., & Roberts, P. (2006). Pre-Incident Indicators of 
Terrorist Incidents:The Identification of Behavioral, Geographic,and Temporal Patterns 
of Preparatory Conduct. Washington, DC: National Criminal Justice Reference Service. 
 
Snijders, T. A., Steglich, C. E., & Schweinberger, M. (2007). Modeling the Co-evolution 
of Networks and Behavior. In K. Eds.van Montfort, H. Oud, & A. Satorra, Longitudinal 
models in the behavioral and related sciences (pp. 41-71). Mahwah, New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
State Department. (2015). U.S. Relations with France. State Department Bureau of 
European and Eurasian Affairs. 
 
Tibshirani, R. (1996). Regression Shrinkage and Selection via the Lasso. Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), 58(1), 267-288. 
 
115 
 
Tlemçani, R. (1997, March). Islam in France: The French Have Themselves to Blame. 
Middle East Quarterly , 4(1), 31-38. 
 
Townsend, E. (2007). Suicide Terrorists: Are they suicidal? Suicide and Life Threatening 
Behavior, 37(1), 35-49. 
 
Victor, B. (2003, October 17). Raising a Generation of Martyrs. Chicago Tribune. 
 
Victor, B. (2004). Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide 
Bombers. Robinson Publishing. 
 
Viorst, M. (1996, September/October). The Muslims of France: Islam Abroad. Foreign 
Affairs Journal. 
 
Way, D. (2003). Targeting Terrorists: Can GIS Lead the Attack? . GEO World. 
 
Wheeler, D. C. (2009). Simultaneous coefficient penalization and model selection in 
geographically weighted regression: the geographically weighted lasso. Environment 
and Planning A, 41, 722-742. 
 
Willis, H. H., LaTourrette, T., Kelly, T. K., Hickey, S., & Neill, S. (2007). Risk Modeling for 
Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. RAND Corporation. Center for 
Terrorism Risk Management Policy. 
 
Woo, G. (2003, April 22). Evolution of Terrorist Risk Modeling. Journal of Reinsurance,7. 
 
Würger, T. (2014, August 13). Suras and Tolerance: Meet Europe's Gay Imam. Spiegel 
Online. 
 
Yildirim, J., Ocal, N., & Korucu, N. (2013). Analysing the Determinants of Terrorism in 
Turkey using Geographically Weigted Regression. Defence and Peace Economics, 
24(3), 195-209. 
 
Zou, H., & Hastie, T. (2005). Regularization and variable selection via the Elastic Net. 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B, 67(2), 302-320. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
                                            VITA 
ELYKTRA CLAIRE EISMAN 
 
Born, Miami Beach, Florida 
 
B.S., Electrical Engineering 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
2009    Research Assistant in GIS/Remote Sensing 
Disaster Risk Reduction Center 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
2011    M.A., International Studies 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
Research Assistant for GIS/Remote Sensing 
Disaster Risk Reduction Center 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
    Graduate Certificate in National Security Studies 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
2011 - 2015   Doctoral Candidate 
Florida International University 
Miami, Florida 
 
PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS 
 
Eisman, Elyktra. The Role of GIS in DRR: Classifying and improving GIS capabilities in 
small towns and rural areas. working paper. Florida International University. Miami: 
Disaster Risk Reduction in the Americas Latin American and Caribbean Center, 2009. 
 
--. “Online News Media Impact on Disaster Response: October 26, 2010 Indonesian 
Disaster Case Study.” The International Journal of the Constructed Environment 2.2 
(2012): 143-178. 
